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INTRODUCTION 
 Domestic abuse. The term immediately conjures up images na-
tionally spread through such highly publicized events as the murder 
trial of O.J. Simpson and the saga of John and Lorena Bobbit, hit 
tunes like Tracy Chapman’s Behind the Wall,1 and movies like Julia 
Robert’s Sleeping with the Enemy2 or Farrah Fawcett’s The Burning 
Bed.3 Everyone can also tell a more local story about domestic vio-
lence, be it one carried in a hometown newspaper or known about the 
neighbors. After a long history of hiding domestic violence behind 
closed bedroom doors, everyone now knows all about the existence 
and prevalence of domestic violence.4 Or do we? The images we asso-
ciate with domestic violence depict the male as batterer and the fe-
male as victim.  Yet, despite the critical importance of first acknowl-
edging and then eradicating the male abuse of women, an equally 
important but untold story remains.5 Women can be batterers. Men 
can be victims. 
 Over the last twenty-five years, leading sociologists have repeat-
edly found that men and women commit violence at similar rates. 
The 1977 assertion that “the phenomenon of husband battering”6 is 
as prevalent as wife abuse is confirmed by nationally representative 
studies, such as the Family Violence Surveys, as well as by numerous 
                                                                                                                    
 1. TRACY CHAPMAN, Behind the Wall, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Electra/Asylum 1983). 
 2. SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY (20th Century Fox 1991). 
 3. THE BURNING BED (Tisch-Avnet Prod. Co. 1984). 
 4. On the historic privacy of domestic violence and the successful efforts to make 
domestic violence a public issue, see infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 5. Throughout this Article, my use of the terms domestic, intimate, and spousal vio-
lence or abuse are used to refer to men and women who have experienced physical violence 
at the hands of their partner. These violent couples may be married or not married, living 
together or apart. Certainly other forms of domestic violence exist, such as child abuse, 
elder abuse, homosexual abuse, and sibling abuse. However, purely as a shorthand meas-
ure, the terms are relied upon here exclusively to refer to violence between heterosexual 
partners. For recognition of the other forms of domestic violence, see infra notes 297-300 
and accompanying text. 
 6. Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Battered Husband Syndrome, 2 VICTIMOLOGY: AN 
INT’L J. 499, 499 (1977). For a discussion of Steinmetz’s work, see infra Part I.A.  
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other sources.7 However, despite the wealth and diversity of the so-
ciological research and the consistency of the findings, female vio-
lence is not recognized within the extensive legal literature on do-
mestic violence.  Instead, the literature consistently suggests that 
only men commit domestic violence. Either explicitly, or more often 
implicitly, through the failure to address the subject in any objective 
manner, female violence is denied, defended and minimized. 
 How is it that our general legal understanding of domestic vio-
lence as defined by the male abuse of women is so squarely contra-
dicted by the empirical reality? Honestly answering this question re-
quires tracing the history of both the theory and practice of domestic 
violence law. Undertaking such an exploration, one quickly finds that 
the “discovery” of domestic violence is rooted in the essential feminist 
tenet that society is controlled by an all-encompassing patriarchal 
structure.8  This fundamental feminist understanding of domestic 
violence has far-reaching implications. By dismissing the possibility 
of female violence, the framework of legal programs and social norms 
is narrowly shaped to respond only to the male abuse of women. Fe-
male batterers cannot be recognized. Male victims cannot be treated. 
If we are to truly address the phenomenon of domestic violence, the 
legal response to domestic violence and the biases which underlie it 
must be challenged. 
 Through an open discussion of domestic abuse, Part I of this Arti-
cle endeavors to expose the fact that domestic violence is committed 
by women. In so doing, I introduce to legal literature the first exten-
sive account of the Family Violence Surveys and various other stud-
ies completed over the last twenty-five years which have repeatedly 
found that men and women commit violence at similar rates.9 After 
exploring the tendency to deny, defend or minimize the violence of 
women in Part II and then arguing that female violence must be ad-
dressed, I assert in Part III that today’s refusal to react is a product 
                                                                                                                    
 7. For a discussion of the Family Violence Surveys and related work on intimate vio-
lence, see infra notes 14-35 and accompanying text. 
 8. See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 1-13 
(1979). For further discussion of the patriarchal beginnings of domestic violence, see infra 
notes 109, 116, 254 and accompanying text. 
 9. In relation to the thousands of articles on domestic violence, a LEXIS/NEXIS 
search found that the Family Violence Surveys are cited in only twenty-six articles. None 
of these articles gave any meaningful critical examination of the Family Violence Surveys. 
In fact, only one article gave anything more than a cursory footnote reference to the sur-
veys’ coverage of female intimate violence. The one article which did contain any substan-
tive discussion of the National Family Violence Surveys did so only in order to compare it 
to the National Violence Against Women Survey (which was completed by the article’s au-
thor) and the National Crime Victimization Survey. Patricia Tjaden, Extent and Nature of 
Intimate Partner Violence as Measured by the National Violence Against Women Survey, 47 
LOY. L. REV. 41, 50-51 (2001). For further discussion of the National Violence Against 
Women Survey and the National Crime Victimization Survey, see infra notes 59, 158 and 
accompanying text. 
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of the feminist control over the issue of domestic violence. Female 
violence presents both a threat to feminist theory as well as to the 
practice of domestic violence law. Notwithstanding such concerns, 
today’s myopic understanding of domestic violence has serious impli-
cations.  Limiting this examination to the criminal justice system, 
Part IV considers how the feminist definition of domestic violence 
has skewed arrest and prosecution philosophies, resulting primarily 
in having only male batterers criminally pursued. The Part also re-
views how rehabilitative programs are geared toward treating do-
mestic violence as the byproduct of a patriarchal society, thereby 
only producing programs which address male violence. Similarly, the 
services for domestic violence victims, in particular, the availability 
of shelters, have also been shaped by the feminist definition of do-
mestic violence. In conclusion, Part V calls for challenging the exist-
ing gendered definition of domestic violence and thereby demands 
changing our norms and institutions so that we may honestly work 
toward addressing and eliminating domestic violence. 
 Having set out the prerequisite roadmap, it is important to em-
phasize and re-emphasize what this Article is not. It is not an at-
tempt to minimize or question in any respect the magnitude or seri-
ousness of the intimate violence inflicted on women by men. Rather, 
it is an attempt to look candidly at the possibility of the violence in-
flicted on men by women, look at the reaction to such revelations, 
discuss the explanations for and implications of such responses, and 
call for a more honest, open discourse on domestic violence. 
I.   THE STUDY OF INTIMATE VIOLENCE 
 The reality of husband abuse was first nationally exposed with 
the release of several studies during the 1970s. The findings of these 
early studies were startling. Not only were women engaging in inti-
mate violence, but their propensity for such acts as compared to male 
abuse of intimate female partners was similar in a number of ways. 
Such radical reports ignited a controversy which continues today. 
Husband battering continues to be heatedly denied, defended and 
minimized. However, when the early studies of husband abuse, its 
confirmation by a variety of later research, and the attacks on the 
projects are examined together in a critical fashion, a simple truth 
remains. Women batter. 
A.   The Early Studies 
 In her 1977 work entitled The Battered Husband Syndrome, soci-
ologist Suzanne Steinmetz was among the first to bring public and 
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academic attention to the “phenomenon of husband battering.”10 
While the article was brief, it was explosive.  Professor Steinmetz 
studied the use of physical violence by husbands and wives in five 
independent surveys conducted by various family violence research 
teams.11  Such surveys relied primarily upon the “Conflicts Tactic 
Scales” (CTS). Developed in 1971 to measure family violence, CTS 
breaks physical force and violence into eight categories ranging from 
(1) throwing things; (2) pushing, shoving or grabbing; (3) hitting or 
slapping; (4) kicking, biting or hitting with a fist; (5) hitting or trying 
to hit with something; (6) beating up; (7) threatening with a knife or 
gun; and finally, (8) using a knife or gun.12 
1.   Use 
 In four out of the five studies reported, Professor Steinmetz found 
that husbands and wives are roughly equal in their use of any form 
of physical violence. While data from three of the reported studies 
finding gender parity was based on her individual work,13 the fourth 
set of data was from the landmark National Family Violence Survey 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 499. 
 11. In addition to the empirical data, Steinmetz’s work examines spousal violence by 
comparing the historic treatment of husband and wife abuse and its portrayal in comic 
strips. Id. at 499-501. It is from relying on such a variety of sources that Steinmetz con-
cludes the “phenomenon of husband battering” exists and can no longer be ignored. Id. at 
499, 503-08. 
 12. In all, CTS is comprised of eighteen items, divided into three approaches to resolv-
ing conflict: (1) rational discussion, (2) verbal and non-verbal hostile expressions (which 
are not physical) and (3) the use of physical force and violence. It is this last stage of con-
flict resolution, the physical violence continuum, which was, and continues to be, the most 
controversial. For a more detailed explanation of the development and use of CTS, see 
MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 26-
28, 253-66 (1980). For a further discussion of CTS and its critics, see infra notes 52-59 and 
accompanying text. 
 It should be noted that Steinmetz’s study comparison completely omitted the CTS physi-
cal violence category of “beating up.” Further, several of the studies compared by 
Steinmetz did not ask questions specifically addressing kicking, threatening with a knife 
and gun, or use of a knife or gun. For a complete chart of the five studies compared by 
Steinmetz, see Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 502. 
 13. In three separate studies directed by Professor Steinmetz—one involving a ran-
dom sample of couples in New Castle, Delaware; the second based upon a broad based non-
representative U.S. sample; and the third relying upon a sample of Canadian college stu-
dents—she found that husband and wives were roughly equal in their use of any form of 
physical violence. In the Delaware study, 47% of husbands were reported to have used 
some form of physical violence against their wives at some point during the marriage, 43% 
of wives also were reported to have used violence (on at least one occasion) during the mar-
riage. From the Canadian sample of fifty-two families, 23% of husbands resorted to vio-
lence, compared to 21% of wives within the sample. Similarly, in the broad-based, non-
representative U.S. sample of ninety-four couples, 32% of husbands and 28% of wives were 
reported to use violence during their marriages. While the percentages vary between stud-
ies, the rates of husband and wife violence within each study are similar. Steinmetz, supra 
note 6, at 501-03. For Steinmetz’s work dedicated to the Delaware study, see SUZANNE K. 
STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: ASSERTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, AND ABUSIVE FAMILY 
INTERACTION (1977). 
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of 1975.14 Directed by sociologists Richard Gelles, Murray A. Straus 
and Suzanne Steinmetz through the support of the Family Violence 
Research Program of the University of New Hampshire, the team 
was responsible for conducting the first national survey dedicated to 
family violence. Focusing specifically on spousal violence and child 
abuse, a nationally representative sample of 2143 “intact couples” 
was selected.15 From this sample one adult in each couple was inter-
viewed in person and questioned about family conflicts which had oc-
curred over the last twelve months and conflicts which had occurred 
at any time during the marriage or parent-child relationship.16 The 
Family Violence Research Laboratory’s national survey proved con-
sistent with Steinmetz’s other work. Reporting the rate of marital 
violence committed only in the year 1975, the data reflected gender 
parity—12% of husbands and 12% of wives had used violence during 
the year 1975 against their mates.17 
 The final, fifth comparison study did suggest husbands used vio-
lence at a greater rate than wives.18 However, unlike the other four 
surveys, such results were recognized to be skewed as half of the 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 501-03. Many books and papers devoted exclusively to 
the 1975 Family Violence Survey, as well as comparing it to the later surveys, have been 
published. For one of the first published papers dedicated to the 1975 survey, see Murray 
A. Straus, Wife Beating: How Common and Why?, 2 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT’L J. 443 (1977). 
For the first book devoted to the 1975 survey and authored by its leading sociologists, see 
STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12. For later works comparing the 1975 survey with later, simi-
lar surveys conducted in 1985 and 1992 by the same individuals, see RICHARD J. GELLES, 
INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES (3d. ed. 1997) (comparing results of the 1975, 1985 and 
1992 surveys) [hereinafter INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES]; RICHARD J. GELLES & 
MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE (1988) (comparing the 1975 and 1985 surveys for 
a broad, public audience) [hereinafter INTIMATE VIOLENCE]; MURRAY A. STRAUS & 
RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND 
ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES (1989) (comparing the 1975 & 1985 surveys 
for an academic audience)[hereinafter PHYSICAL VIOLENCE]. For further discussion of these 
three leading surveys, see infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
 15. In order to qualify as an intact couple, the couple was required to consist of a man 
and woman currently living together. While marriage was not required, the survey charac-
terizes all intercouple violence as spousal, without drawing any marital/non-marital dis-
tinctions. Of the 2143 families surveyed, 1146 families met the study’s criterion of having 
children between the ages of 3 and 17. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 24-26. For criti-
cisms by the Family Violence Research Laboratory of their sampling methodology and ef-
forts to improve it in later studies, see id. at 25-26; PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 
9-14, 49-73. 
 16. Of the 2143 families, 960 men and 1183 women were interviewed. STRAUS ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 24.  
 17. While the 12% figure is drastically lower than the percentages provided in the 
other surveys reported in Steinmetz’s work, the 12% figure represents violence during a 
one-year reporting figure, while the other surveys report violence occurring at any time 
during the marriage. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 502. For a summary of Steinmetz’s three 
projects, see discussion supra Part I.A. 
 18. Reporting on the use of any violence during the course of a marriage, the study 
found 47% of husbands, as compared to only 32% of wives, had used violence on at least 
one occasion. RICHARD J. GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME 51-52 (1972) (reporting survey re-
sults). 
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survey participants were selected from police blotter or social service 
agency reports of domestic violence which were recognized to dispro-
portionately reflect male-perpetrated domestic violence.19 
2.   Frequency 
 The comparable use of physical violence by spouses marks only 
the beginning of the similarities evidenced by these comprehensive 
first studies of intimate violence. Arguably, husband abuse can be 
discounted in comparison to wife abuse if women are found to utilize 
physical violence against their spouses in a much more sparing fash-
ion than men. However, the various surveys consistently reported 
that women not only use violence at rates similar to men, but that 
women match, and often exceed, husbands in the frequency with 
which they engage in violent behavior.20 
 Later studies confirm the findings of these early, controversial 
works. In 1985, the Family Research Laboratory conducted another 
national study.21 Reaching more than 6000 families through tele-
                                                                                                                    
 19. See Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 503. For further discussion of the ongoing bias of 
recognizing male abuse and ignoring female abuse evident in cultural norms and in the 
policies of legal and social service agencies, see infra note 90 and accompanying text. See 
also infra Part IV.B. 
 20. Counting the number of reported acts by husbands and wives during the course of 
their marriages, each of Steinmetz’s three surveys reported wives engaging in more acts of 
physical violence than husbands. Looking only at the frequency of violence in couples in 
which one or more acts of violence had occurred, the reported frequency of violence for 
wives versus husbands was as follows: in the Delaware survey, 4.04 versus 3.52; in the 
Canadian survey, 7.82 versus 6.00; in the national non-representative survey, 7.00 versus 
6.60. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 503. 
 Similarly, the Family Violence Research Survey of 1975 also found that women on aver-
age committed more acts of violence in the reporting year of 1975 than husbands.  Again 
looking only at the frequency of violence in couples in which one or more acts of violence 
had occurred during the year 1975, Straus’s report reflects wives committed an average of 
10.3 physically violent acts against husbands, while husbands averaged 8.8 acts against 
their wives. Id. at 503. However, in order not to “overstate the case,” Straus states a pref-
erence for relying upon the median as better reflecting the typical frequency of violent be-
havior in couples for which violence had occurred during 1975. Straus, supra note 14, at 
445. This median reflects husbands’ medium frequency of violent acts for the year was 2.5 
acts, while wives’ median frequency of violent behavior was reported slightly higher, at 3.0 
acts for 1975. Id. For a full narrative and statistical frequency discussion of the Family 
Violence Research Survey of 1975, see STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 41-43; Straus, su-
pra note 14. 
 While the fifth survey in Steinmetz’s study (which was completed by Richard J. Gelles) 
reported that men relied upon physical violence more frequently than women in their in-
timate relationships, such results need to be considered critically in light of the frequency 
rates consistently reported by the other survey and perhaps more importantly, the skewed 
nature of the sample gathered to be surveyed. In his 1974 survey, Gelles found, for exam-
ple, that 11% of husbands and 5% of wives engaged in violent acts between two and six 
times a year. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 503. For further discussion of the skewed nature 
of samples used in various domestic violence studies, see infra note 59 and accompanying 
text. 
 21. There is a wealth of literature which relies upon the 1985 survey and compares its 
findings to the earlier surveys (particularly its predecessor survey of 1975). Two critical 
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phone interviews, the research team sought to ensure its data was 
representative by creating a sample group over twice the size of the 
1975 survey as well as “oversamples” of certain minority groups and 
populations in certain states who were at risk of under-
representation.22 Relying again on the Conflict Tactics Scale, the 
1985 study confirmed the use and frequency of physical violence by 
men and women.23 
3.   Severity 
 While the similarity of rates of physical violence by wives and 
husbands presented by the various surveys is revealing, such data is 
not sufficient to make an accurate comparison of the violent nature of 
wives and husbands. As the definition of “physical violence” used in 
the various CTS-based studies ranges from “throwing something” to 
“using a knife or gun,” wives arguably could compare to husbands in 
use and frequency of violent behavior, but not in the severity of the 
type of violence employed. 
 Some differences per type of violence utilized by each sex are cer-
tainly evident. Women were found to be twice as likely to throw 
something at their husbands.24 Wives were also more likely than 
husbands to kick, bite and punch.25 They were also more likely to hit, 
or try to hit, their spouses with something and more likely to 
threaten their spouses with a knife or gun.26 Husbands, on the other 
hand, rated higher in the four categories of pushing, grabbing and 
                                                                                                                    
books were written by the surveys’ authors and are dedicated to the subject: INTIMATE 
VIOLENCE, supra note 14 (written for wide public distribution); and PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, 
supra note 14 (written for the academic community). For other discussions of these two 
leading surveys, see supra notes 14-18, 20 and accompanying text, and infra notes 66-68 
and accompanying text. 
 22. In total, the 1985 “resurvey” by the Family Research Laboratory interviewed 
6,002 households, with 4,032 households selected in proportion to household distribution 
per state and three “oversamples” consisting of: (1) an oversample of 958 households in 
twenty-five states in order to assure 100 interviews in thirty-six key states; (2) an over-
sample of 508 black households; and (3) an oversample of 516 Hispanic households. In or-
der to accommodate the increase in interviews from the 1975 in-person survey, interviews 
in the 1985 study were completed via telephone. For further discussion of the methodolo-
gies used in the second national survey, see INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 207-12. 
For a scholarly analysis and comparison of the 1975 and 1985 methodologies, see PHYSICAL 
VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 17-28. For further discussion of the 1975 survey, see supra 
notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
 23. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 95-99.  
 24. During 1975, 5% of wives threw something at their husbands, compared to 3% of 
husbands. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 37-38; Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 502. 
 25. During 1975, 3% of wives kicked, bit or slapped, as compared to 2% of husbands. 
STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 37-38; Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 502. 
 26. During 1975, 3% of wives hit, or tried to hit their spouse with something, as com-
pared to 2% of husbands. Six percent of wives threatened their husbands with a knife or 
gun, as compared to 0.4% of husbands. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 37-38; Steinmetz, 
supra note 6, at 502. 
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shoving;27 slapping or hitting;28 beating up;29 and actually using a 
knife or gun.30 Yet, such per category differences did not evidence 
that men were unquestionably more prone to acts of severe domestic 
violence than women. Combining the data collected on the last five 
categories of physical violence to create a “Severe Violence Index,” 
wives were found to engage in more severe acts of violence than hus-
bands.31 Taking the frequency of severely violent behavior into ac-
count does not mitigate these findings. Wives show a pattern of se-
verely violent behavior statistically comparable to husbands.32 Con-
sistent with this “over-all similarity” found in the 1975 survey,33 
other early reports also found that husbands and wives show “equal 
potential” for intimate violence and that they “initiate[d] similar acts 
of violence.”34 
B.   Recent Findings 
 These staggering findings on the use, frequency and severity of 
violence similarly perpetrated by husbands and wives kept sociolo-
gists committed to the study of family violence. In 1992, members of 
the Family Violence Research Laboratory completed yet another na-
tionally representative survey.35 The study reaffirmed that wives en-
                                                                                                                    
 27. During 1975, 11% of husbands pushed, grabbed or shoved as compared to 8% of 
wives. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 37-38; Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 502.  
 28. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 37-38. 
 29. Id. 
 30. As reported in 1975, husbands used a knife or gun on their wives in 0.3% of cases, 
as compared to 0.2% of wives committing similar behavior. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, 
at 37-38; Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 502. 
 31. As reported in 1975, 3.8% of husbands engaged in “severe violence,” as compared 
to 4.6% of wives. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 39-41. The last five CTS categories are: 
kicking, biting or hitting with a fist; hitting or trying to hit with something; beating up; 
and threatening with or using a knife or gun. For further discussion of CTS, see supra note 
12 and accompanying text. 
 32. Looking just at couples reporting spouse “beating,” the survey found that in about 
one-third of the cases there had been only one incident of severe violence and that wives 
and husbands were equal in committing such “one-time” severe violence. STRAUS ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 41. Comparing households where two acts of severe violence occurred, 
20% of severely violent husbands and 12.5% of severely violent wives committed two severe 
acts. Id. Forty-seven percent of “wife-beating” husbands beat their wives three or more 
times in 1975 compared to 53% of wives who beat their husbands three or more times. Id. 
at 41-42. Arguably, ending the comparison at three times or more is not a sufficient basis 
for comparison because within such a category a spouse of one sex who engages in three 
acts of severe violence is measured equally against a spouse of the opposite sex who en-
gages in many more acts of severe violence. For a discussion of such criticisms of the Se-
vere Violence Index, see infra Part II.A.2(a). 
 33. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 37-38. The specific act comparison chart is repro-
duced in Steinmetz’s work without the “beating up” item. See Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 
502. 
 34. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 505. 
 35. The 1992 survey was completed with a nationally representative sample of 1970 
families and was conducted through telephone interviews by Glenda Kaufman Kantor. The 
results of the 1992 survey and its comparison to the two National Family Violence Surveys 
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gaged in intimate violence at rates comparable to husbands.36 How-
ever, a comparison of the 1975, 1985 and 1992 studies also reveals an 
important trend. Despite the finding that husbands and wives were 
roughly equal in terms of the percentages of spouses who engaged in 
any act of violence, the gap in the use of severe violence by husbands 
and wives had widened.37 In comparing the 1975 and 1985 results, 
researchers observed that while the male use of severe physical vio-
lence had declined 21%, the female use of such violence remained vir-
tually constant.38 In the 1992 results, researchers again found that 
while severe assaults by wives remained fairly steady, the rate of se-
vere abuse perpetrated by husbands decreased between 1985 and 
1992 by almost 37%.39 In overall comparison to the constant rate of 
husband abuse, the combination of such significant decreases in wife-
beating represented a 50% drop between 1975 and 1992.40 
II.   THE REACTIONS 
 While the study of husband abuse by the Family Violence Re-
search Laboratory, its associates, and others engaged in similar pro-
jects has received some praise, such support has been completely 
overshadowed by the degree and extent of criticism levied against it. 
                                                                                                                    
was presented to the 13th World Congress of Sociology held in Bielefeld, Germany via a 
paper by Straus and Kantor.  Murray A. Straus & Glenda K. Kantor, Changes in Spouse 
Assault Rates from 1975 to 1992:  A Comparison of Three National Surveys in the United 
States, in POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD (Herwig Brig et al. 
eds., 1994). For discussion of the 1992 survey, see BEVERLY FORD, VIOLENT 
RELATIONSHIPS: BATTERING AND ABUSE AMONG ADULTS 13 (2001); INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN 
FAMILIES, supra note 14, at 70-92; Richard J. Gelles, Estimating the Incidence and Preva-
lence of Violence Against Women: National Data Systems and Sources, 6 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 784, 797 (2000). 
 36. For a discussion of such a study, see supra note 35. 
 37. For an earlier discussion of the lower reporting of severe violence by men than by 
women as reported in 1975, see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
 38. In reporting on the use of “severe violence” (kicking, hitting or trying to hit with 
something; beating up; and threatening or using a knife or gun) as measured by CTS, the 
researchers reported that husband-to-wife use of “severe violence” decreased from thirty-
eight husbands per 1000 couples in 1975 to thirty husbands per 1000 couples in 1985. By 
comparison, wives’ use of “severe violence” remained constant, with women reported to use 
“severe violence” at the rate of forty-six women per 1000 couples in 1975 and forty-four 
women per 1000 couples in 1985. INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 250-51. For a dis-
cussion of the 1985 statistics and their comparison to the 1975 statistics, see id. at 108-15; 
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 118-21, 529-34. For discussion of the “Severe Vio-
lence Index” see supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 39. While the 1985 rate of wife-beating was thirty per 1000 couples in 1985, the 1992 
rate was nineteen per 1000 couples. FORD, supra note 35, at 11-13; Gelles, supra note 35, 
at 797. 
 40. The 1992 study also included a comparison of violence by gender through a “minor 
assault” index, which was comprised of the less severe pushing, grabbing, shoving and 
slapping categories. Minor assaults perpetrated by husbands appeared to decrease be-
tween 1975 and 1992, minor assaults perpetrated by wives increased. See FORD, supra 
note 35, at 13; see also Gelles, supra note 35, at 797. For a discussion of the gender report-
ing differences found in comparing the studies, see infra Part II.A.2.(b). 
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Criticisms have ranged from personally attacking the researchers, to 
more academic efforts directed at attacking the work itself by deny-
ing the validity of the reports, to an outright defense of the violent 
behavior of women or otherwise minimizing its significance. Yet, 
while the nature of the criticisms has differed, they have invariably 
all been vehement. 
A.   Denying Female Violence 
1.   By Woozles and Scare Tactics 
 In the public arena, the media’s reaction to the reports of husband 
abuse was an overreaction. Estimates that two million males in the 
United States were subject to domestic violence quickly became in-
flated by the newspapers to twelve million.41 As the Family Violence 
Research team quipped, “Woozles, it seems, tend to multiply in direct 
proportion to the degree of controversy associated with a story.”42 
 Other reactions could not be responded to so lightly. Perhaps the 
most physically and personally intimidating behavior was directed at 
Suzanne Steinmetz, who had first brought the issue to the public’s 
attention.43 Steinmetz appeared on such shows as the Today Show 
and Phil Donahue.44 Her work was reported in various newspapers 
and magazines, including a full-page story in Time magazine.45 Yet, 
while Steinmetz’s work received some support, the public attack 
against Steinmetz and her family evidenced the public’s overwhelm-
ing rejection of her work.46  Verbal threats were launched against her 
and her children—at home and in public. Threatening phone calls 
were made to Steinmetz and the sponsors of her speaking engage-
ments in order to prevent Steinmetz from further publicizing her 
work. On one occasion, a bomb threat was called into an ACLU meet-
ing at which Steinmetz was scheduled to speak.47 Professionally, 
Steinmetz was also threatened. In an attempt to prevent her from 
receiving tenure, every female faculty member at the University of 
Delaware was lobbied by individuals calling on behalf of the women’s 
rights movement.48 Academicians also became involved in the per-
                                                                                                                    
 41. The “twelve million” figure is attributed to the reporting of Roger Langley, a jour-
nalist for the New York Daily News. For discussion of the early media reports, see 
INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 105-06. 
 42. Id. at 105. 
 43. For a discussion of Steinmetz’s work, see supra Part I.A. 
 44. PHILIP W. COOK, ABUSED MEN: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 109-14 
(1997); INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 105-06. 
 45. COOK, supra note 44, at 109-14; INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 105-06. 
 46. For my discussion of why there has been such a strong reaction to the study of 
battered men, see infra Part III. 
 47. COOK, supra note 44, at 109-12. 
 48. Id. at 112. 
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sonal attack, deriding her work as anti-feminist and simply biased to 
its funding source.49 
 Other social scientists committed to the study of husband abuse 
and family violence were similarly mistreated.50 Such tactics seem to 
have proven effective. Both researchers who were involved in the 
early projects, and even those who might have become involved, ad-
mit that they now choose to give the topic of battered men “wide 
berth.”51 Such a commentary is tragic, not only for those interested in 
female violence, but for all of us committed to protecting academic 
research and intellectual freedom. 
2.   By Methodological Critique 
(a)   CTS Challenges 
 Beyond woozles and scare tactics, a more effective and facially 
neutral intellectual tactic used to silence the study of female violence 
has been an attack on the methodology. As an initial criticism, the 
CTS-based reports, by definition, allow only a focus on violence re-
sulting from conflict situations. While acknowledging the value of 
CTS in other social studies, sociologists critique their use in the 
study of family.52 Because the scale’s focus upon “conflict” does not 
acknowledge the use of violence in a familial setting as a tactic of co-
ercive control, such methodology fails to emphasize the use of vio-
lence by men to maintain power or the use of violence without provo-
cation.53 The CTS reporting methodology is also criticized for its lim-
ited focus upon the acts of violence, not the consequences, or more 
specifically, the severity of the injuries resulting from such acts.54 For 
example, the ordering of the violence with such acts as “trying to hit 
with something” regarded as more severe than “slapping” is deemed 
inappropriate given the potential of severe physical injury which can 
result from a slap, while no injury could ever result from throwing 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Id. at 109-12. 
 50. Many years after the initial reporting of the family violence research team, a 
seemingly embittered Straus charged that although his early work on violence against 
women had been commonly relied upon by feminists in their arguments of institutional 
male violence, he was simply “excommunicated” from the feminist ranks after the family 
violence surveys’ publications. Murray A. Straus, Physical Assaults by Wives: A Major So-
cial Problem, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 82 (Richard Gelles & 
Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993). For earlier reaction of the family researchers criticized for 
their findings, see INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 105-06. 
 51. INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 106. 
 52. Kersti A. Yllö, Through a Feminist Lens: Gender, Power and Violence, in CURRENT 
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 50, at 47, 52-53.  
 53. Demie Kurz, Physical Assaults by Husbands: A Major Social Problem, in 
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 50, at 88, 94-96; Yllö, supra 
note 52, at 53. For the related critique that the CTS’ noncontextual approach fails to un-
derstand the gendered nature of domestic violence, see infra Part II.B.2. 
 54. Yllö, supra note 52, at 52-53. 
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something at someone but failing to strike.55 Criticism is also levied 
at separate groupings of various types of violence which are instead 
seen as overlapping.56 
 Recognizing such concerns, the Family Violence Research Labora-
tory addressed them in their initial studies.57 However, rather than 
rejecting the methodology and therefore any information it produced 
outright, the researchers noted that CTS was previously accepted as 
a methodology in family studies limited to wife abuse. They therefore 
rationalized that the research methodology remained valuable in a 
combined study of husband abuse and wife abuse.58 Moreover, de-
spite being collected through CTS methodology, the research of the 
Family Violence Researchers yields similar results to numerous 
other studies of husband and wife abuse, including those which rely 
upon non-CTS methodology.59 
                                                                                                                    
 55. R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Research as Social Action: The Struggle 
for Battered Women, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 51, 59 (Kersti Yllö & 
Michele Bograd eds., 1988). 
 56. For example, there is criticism over separating “kick[ing], bit[ing], or hit[ting] 
with a fist” from “[b]eat[ing] up the other one.” Id. at 59. For a review of the CTS catego-
ries, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 57. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 27-28. 
 58. Straus, supra note 50, at 84. 
 59. By 1999, over 100 studies are counted as consistently finding that men and 
women engage in domestic violence at similar rates. See Murray A. Straus, The Contro-
versy Over Domestic Violence by Women: A Methodological, Theoretical, and Sociology of 
Science Analysis, in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 17, 17-18 (Ximena B. Arriaga 
& Stuart Oskamp eds., 1999). For a review of a number of studies of family and partner 
abuse yielding similar rates of abuse by men and women, see id. at 25-27; Straus, supra 
note 50, at 68-72 (discussing the results obtained from a study of the assault rate of part-
ners in married and cohabitating relations and a study of the assault rate of individuals in 
dating relationships); see also PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 162 (comparing the 
similarity in data on female and male abuse to earlier studies and concluding that “[t]hese 
findings are so consistent that they leave little doubt about the high rate of assaults by 
women”); Terrie E. Moffitt, Partner Violence Among Young Adults, NAT’L INST. JUST.: 
RESEARCH PREVIEW (Apr. 1999) (discussing preliminary results of an over twenty-year on-
going longitudinal study in New Zealand finding women reporting greater acts of domestic 
violence against their partners than men); Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband 
Abuse, or Mutual Combat? A Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 55, at 96 (noting numerous studies supporting 
the work of the Family Violence Research team through findings which reported “23% to 
71% of battered women used violence . . . against their abusers”).  
 For discussion of other non-CTS studies yielding comparable results regarding the simi-
lar usage of violence by men and women, see FORD, supra note 35, at 7-14 (providing an 
overview of numerous critical studies including the National Crime Victimization Survey, 
National Family Violence Surveys, National Youth Survey and homicide and other inti-
mate violence statistics collected by the U.S. Bureau of Statistics); WILLIAM A. STACEY ET 
AL., THE VIOLENT COUPLE (1994) (conducting a survey of eighty-six couples in Austin, 
Texas who were participating in a counseling program, but noting at the outset the skewed 
nature of the sample, largely because in two-thirds of the cases the couples were partici-
pating as a result of a court referral to the counseling program in lieu of the male member 
of the couple being convicted of domestic violence); Barbara J. Morse, Beyond the Conflict 
Tactics Scale: Assessing Gender Differences in Partner Violence, 10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 
251 (1995) (reporting the results of the National Youth Survey, a nationally representative 
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(b)   Gender Concerns 
 Other important methodological issues may also be accounted for. 
Of significant concern is the belief that men tend to underreport 
their acts of domestic violence, and that any study relying upon sur-
veying men would therefore yield inaccurate results.60 However, in a 
variety of ways, the husband-abuse studies minimized this threat. 
First, while the CTS surveys collected data on households, typically 
only one spouse completed the questionnaire or interview. Since, in 
the majority of instances, the participating spouse was the wife, the 
perceived threat of unreliable male reported data was reduced at the 
outset.61 In the 1985 CTS study, the Family Violence Research team 
went further to address the risk of male underreporting by isolating 
the information reported by men from the information reported by 
women. Even when the researchers relied solely on the data reported 
by women, the data revealed that the use of violence by men and 
                                                                                                                    
seventeen-year longitudinal survey of intimate violence among married and cohabitating 
partners and finding trends and patterns of use of minor and severe violence by men and 
women similar to those reported by the National Family Violence Survey). 
 It must be noted that a number of other surveys have found significantly higher rates of 
violence by men than women. In 1997, the results of the National Violence Against Women 
in America Survey (NVAW) were released. NVAW surveyed 16,000 households, equally in-
terviewing 8000 men and 8000 women. It concluded that men physically assaulted their 
female partners at three times the rate women engaged in such behavior. Such conclusions 
regarding disparate rates of assault, however, must be interpreted in light of the survey 
questions which were geared to focusing on injury-producing violence and types of violence 
more likely to be considered criminal. Straus, supra, at 26-27. 
 Similarly, several other commonly cited surveys are the “battered women’s studies” 
which generally rely on data collected from women residing in battered women’s shelters; 
“police call studies,” which are based on statistics gathered from calls made to the police by 
victims of domestic violence, who are typically women; and the National Crime Victims 
Survey, a government survey based upon criminal statistics regarding domestic violence. 
These surveys have been criticized as based on non-representative, skewed samples with 
disproportional numbers of abused women. The battered women’s shelter studies are non-
representative because they rely only upon interviews with female victims who are resid-
ing in shelters. Similarly, because it is acknowledged that male victims of violence are less 
likely to call the police than female victims, the police call surveys also are based on sam-
ples with a disproportionate numbers of female victims. Likewise, the National Crimes 
Victims Survey is seen as non-representative because acts of domestic violence committed 
by men are more commonly reported and treated as a “crime” than domestic violence per-
petrated by women. Straus, supra note 50, at 68-72; see also, STACEY ET AL., supra, at 45 
(acknowledging the unreliability of official police and court statistics on domestic violence 
and quoting one critic as declaring such data to be “practically worthless for purposes of 
criminological research”); Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 503-04 (critiquing earlier studies of 
female violence due to the skewed sample). For a further general discussion of the meth-
odological problems and non-representative concerns in both clinical studies (such as those 
based upon criminal and shelter data) and representative community samples (such as the 
National Family Violence Survey), see Straus, supra note 50, at 77-80. 
 60. Straus, supra note 50, at 68 (acknowledging the concern of male underreporting). 
 61. STEINMETZ, supra note 13, at 14-16 (noting that of the fifty-seven families studied 
in her survey, 35% of the husbands-fathers participated in the questionnaire component of 
the survey, while only 9% of the personal interviews relied upon male participation). For 
further discussion of Steinmetz’s work, see supra notes 6-34 and accompanying text. 
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women remained at similar rates. Moreover, the parity between the 
acts of violence committed by men and women existed when the data 
was separated into the CTS indices of “minor” and “severe” acts of 
violence.62 
B.   Defending Female Violence 
1.   Quantitative Criticisms 
 If the methodological critiques are accurate, the assertion that 
men and women engage in similar patterns of domestic violence can 
be denied fairly. Yet even effectively raising the shortcomings of 
these criticisms (as I have just attempted to do) does not sufficiently 
respond to the critics. For those interested in discrediting the asser-
tion that men and women both act violently, a bolder move is to not 
only accept the female use of violence, but to defend it. In conceding 
that women do engage in acts of domestic violence, female use of vio-
                                                                                                                    
 62. In so doing, the researchers found that males reporting on male violence did tend 
to report more minimal violence than women reporting on male violence. Straus, supra 
note 50, at 68. As reported by women, the 1985 Family Violence Research Survey data in-
dicated the following percentage of spouses who engaged in domestic violence toward their 
mates: 
 
Perpetrator of  
Violence “Minor” “Severe” “None” 
Male 6.9% 4.9% 88.1% 
Female 7.7% 4.4% 87.9% 
 
As reported by men, the 1985 Family Violence Research Survey data indicated the follow-
ing percentage of spouses who engaged in domestic violence toward their mates: 
 
Perpetrator of  
Violence “Minor” “Severe” “None” 
Male 9.2% 1.3% 89.5% 
Female 7.5% 4.7% 87.8% 
 
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 156-57, 162. 
 There appears to be some dispute on the gender honesty question. In comparing the 
1975, 1985 and 1992 data, other statisticians have found that men tended to report greater 
rates of male violence than women, and that women tended to report greater rates of fe-
male violence than men. For a breakdown by gender differences per reporting period, see 
FORD, supra note 35, at 13. See also Gelles, supra note 35, at 797. 
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lence is justified as self-defense—a lifesaving reaction of women who 
are being physically attacked by their male partners.63 
 The development of the battered woman syndrome as a defense 
for crimes committed against abusive male partners, including homi-
cide, evidences the wide acceptance of a woman’s use of violence as 
self-defense.64 The self-defense theory of female domestic violence is 
not, however, fully supported by the statistics. According to the sta-
tistics on intimate violence, while in approximately 50% of cases both 
spouses are reported to act violently, in the remaining 50% only one 
spouse is reported to ever use domestic violence.65 Admittedly, the 
finding that in approximately 50% of cases both spouses engage in 
violence does not help in determining who is initiating the violence.66 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 55, at 59-60. For the self-defense characterization of 
the statistical reporting of violence by women, see Daniel Saunders, When Battered Women 
Use Violence: Husband-Abuse or Self-Defense?, 1 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 47 (1986). For fur-
ther discussion of the battered woman’s defense in employing violence, see infra notes 64, 
69, 137 and accompanying text. 
 64. Lenore Walker, a pioneer in the study of domestic violence, is credited with the 
development of the battered woman’s syndrome. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING 
LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989); Lenore E. 
Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 321 (1992). For a sampling from the tremendous body of literature discussing the 
creation, use, and debate surrounding the battered woman’s syndrome, see ANGELA 
BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987); AMY LOU BUSCH, FINDING THEIR VOICES: 
LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN WHO’VE KILLED (1999); INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 
14, at 141-59 (challenging the notion of “learned helplessness” by reporting on the variety 
of female responses to domestic violence); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing the battered women’s syndrome defense as a reinforcement of 
negative female stereotypes). For further discussion of battered women’s syndrome and its 
relation to the patriarchal definition of domestic violence, see infra notes 109, 116, 254 and 
accompanying text. For further discussion of learned helplessness, see infra note 130 and 
accompanying text. 
 There are few efforts to extend the battered women’s syndrome beyond women to include 
other intimates who are abused and defend themselves with violence. This one-sided appli-
cation of a self-defense theory for intimates supports this Article’s argument regarding the 
unquestioning acceptance of a feminist-oriented definition of domestic violence. See infra 
notes 120, 256 and accompanying text (on the pervasive impact of the feminist definition of 
domestic violence on legal and social institutions). For one author’s effort to extend the 
battered women’s syndrome to all victims of domestic violence, see Hope Toffel, Note, 
Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and Evil Children: Confronting the Myths About Battered 
People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the Argument for Extending Battering Syndrome Self-
Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 337 (1996). 
 65. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 36-37. 
 66. It is interesting to note, however, that the 1985 Family Violence Survey found 
that women were more likely than men to cite using violence as their common response to 
the violence of their partners. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 155-56. Based upon a 
given range of possible responses (from crying, yelling, running to another room, hitting 
back, running out of the house, calling a friend or relative, or calling the police), 24% of 
women and 15% of men cited violence as their common response. Id. at 155. The most 
common response of women was to cry (54%), while the most common response of men was 
“other” (32%). Id. This high report of “other” by men has suggested to researchers that men 
are more likely to ignore the violence of women than to respond in any affirmative manner. 
Id. at 155-56; see also INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 149-50. For a consistent dis-
cussion of the minimization of female violence by men, see infra note 90. 
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Consequently, the battered woman/self-defense theory is a plausible 
explanation for the female use of violence in those cases. However, 
the remaining 50% of couples who report violence by only one spouse 
further breaks down to reveal that while the husband is the sole per-
petrator in one half of such cases, the wife is the sole perpetrator in 
the remaining half.67 Moreover, when questioned specifically as to 
initial abuse, men and women report initiating violence at similar 
rates.68 These virtually identical rates of violence by men and women 
as sole perpetrators call into question the assertion that women’s use 
of domestic violence is always defensive; they also suggest that 
women may be the only physical aggressor in violent relationships as 
often as men.69 
                                                                                                                    
 67. Based on the 1985 National Family Violence Survey results of 495 couples admit-
ting to violence, in 48.6% of the cases both spouses were violent, in 25.9% only the male 
was violent and in 25.5% only the female was violent. Straus, supra note 50, at 74. Simi-
larly, in the 1975 study, 49% of the couples who engaged in violence did so on a mutual ba-
sis, whereas of the remaining 51%, in 27% of the cases only the husband was violent and in 
24% of the cases only the wife was violent. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 16, at 36-37; see also 
INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 146-50, 258 (discussing female and male reaction to 
violence yet providing graph and detailed statistics only for female reaction). 
 68. This statistic did not significantly vary based upon the sex of the survey respon-
dent. Broken down by gender, the 1985 Family Violence Survey reported the following re-
sults regarding who initiated the violence: 
 
Gender  
Reporting Male Initiator Female Initiator No Memory 
Male 43.7% 44.1% 12.2% 
Female 42.6% 52.7% 4.7% 
 
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 154-55. 
 69. Various quantitative studies have been offered to bolster the self-defense motiva-
tion for a woman’s use of violence. In a study first reported in 1986 aimed at determining 
the motivations for a woman’s use of violence, Daniel Saunders, a self-described “feminist 
researcher,” interviewed fifty-two battered women and found that “self-defense” was the 
most frequently cited reason given for the use of violence, with 40% of women using severe 
violence and 30% of women using nonsevere violence as defined by a “modified Conflict 
Tactics Scale.” Saunders, supra note 59, at 102-05. “Fighting Back” was also commonly 
cited, with 33% of women using severe violence and 23% of those using nonsevere violence 
ascribing to such motivation. Id. at 105. By contrast, only one woman (representing 3% of 
the study) who used severe violence and four women (11%) who used nonsevere violence 
explained their motivation as self-initiated. Id. As acknowledged by Saunders, however, in-
terviewing only battered women created a skewed sample which fails to include nonbat-
tered women who rely upon violence. Id. at 108. Without a representative sample of bat-
tered and nonbattered women, Saunders’ study fails to accurately reflect when women’s 
use of violence is self-initiated or in response to male violence. For an earlier, exclusive dis-
cussion of Saunders’ study, see Saunders, supra note 63. Other studies purporting to sup-
port the self-defense theory have also been acknowledged to be inconclusive. See Saunders, 
supra note 59, at 97-101. 
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2.   Qualitative Criticisms 
 Yet, even such quantitative statistics on the similar rates of vio-
lence initiation does not end the controversy surrounding female use 
of domestic violence. Qualitative defenses are also offered to explain 
the female use of violence. An appreciation of the “power and control” 
dynamics of domestic violence cautions against relying solely upon 
such statistics to reject outright the female use of violence as self-
defense theory.70 When the severity of a woman’s violent behavior is 
greater than her spouse’s, it is suggested that a woman’s lack of 
training in less violent reactions may excuse her behavior.71 A 
woman’s anger toward her mate, rather than simply her fear of vio-
lence, is also raised as a defense.72 Such a defense is illustrated, for 
example, in the characterization of the female use, perhaps even ini-
tiation, of domestic violence as simply a “slap the cad” response to of-
fensive, even if not physically violent, male behavior.73 Others have 
gone further in defending the female use of violence. Warning 
against describing male behavior as simply caddish, the defense 
raised instead is that women’s use of violence is warranted when 
men engage in “unwanted sexual advances, belittling of . . . [women], 
verbal intimidation, [and] drunken frenzy.”74 In this vein, the ques-
tion changes from, “[W]ho began [the] hitting?” to, “[W]ho began the 
argument?”75 Such a change is more dangerous than defending fe-
male violence as a response to caddish behavior, for it risks legitimiz-
ing female violence whenever the argument is male initiated. How-
ever, this focus on the argument, rather than on the use of violence, 
is significant in that it exposes the core justification for disregarding 
the violence perpetrated by women. 
 By focusing on the question of who initiates the argument, the 
implication is that because male anger carries the threat of greater 
harm, acts of female violence cannot only be condoned as a preven-
tive defense, but can also be overlooked. In choosing the latter, we 
                                                                                                                    
 70. In reviewing his findings, Straus suggested that statistics on the initiation of vio-
lence by women needed to be interpreted in consideration of such factors as: (1) a woman 
being more likely to take the blame for violence initiation; (2) a woman’s likelihood of un-
derstanding the question “Who initiated the violence?” as “Who initiated the fight?”; (3) a 
woman perhaps being the “first hitter” in an isolated incident, but the act is defensive in 
contrast to the man’s initiation of violence in the relationship; and (4) a woman perhaps 
reporting to have initiated violence in response to a question directed at solely examining 
the most severe incidents of violence and framing a question in such a manner which pre-
vents recognizing that the man may have initiated the use of violence in the relationship. 
See Straus, supra note 50, at 75-76. 
 71. Saunders, supra note 59, at 99 (discussing State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558 
(Wash. 1997)). 
 72. Id. at 107. 
 73. Straus, supra note 50, at 79. 
 74. Kurz, supra note 53, at 96. 
 75. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 155. 
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shift from a position of defending female violence to minimizing its 
consequences. Simply put, female violence can be legitimately ig-
nored because male violence causes greater injury. 
C.   Minimizing Female Violence 
 Since the first controversial exposure of husband battering, there 
has been little debate on the assertion that male domestic violence is 
more likely to produce injury. In attempting to understand why hus-
band battering was given such “selective inattention,” pioneer Suz-
anne Steinmetz determined that the realization of the greater physi-
cal strength of men as compared to women provides the most plausi-
ble explanation for disregarding female violence.76 Male violence pro-
duces injury at six times the rate of female violence.77 Comparing the 
type of injuries also shows that women suffer greater physical and 
psychological harm when physically assaulted. When measuring 
physical injury via the three categories of the need for medical care, 
time off from work, and time spent bedridden, women rank higher in 
every category.78 In terms of psychological injuries, while abused men 
and women consistently display psychosomatic symptoms, abused 
women suffer greater depression and stress levels than abused 
men.79 
                                                                                                                    
 76. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 504-06. For further discussion of Professor Steinmetz’s 
work on female and male domestic violence, see supra notes 10-34 and accompanying text. 
 77. Relying upon the 1985 Family Violence Research Survey, it was concluded that 
3% of male assaults caused injuries compared to injuries produced in only 0.4% of the cases 
involving female assault. Straus, supra note 50, at 69; see also Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 
505. 
 78. These statistics were based upon the 1985 Family Violence Research Survey. See 
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 152. According to the results regarding the need for 
medical care, 7.3% of women versus 1% of men who were the victims of “severe violence” as 
defined by the CTS scale required such attention. Id. at 157. Neither sex reported the need 
for medical care when victim to minor violence, as defined by CTS. Id. In response to the 
need to take time off from work, 19% of women versus 10% of men resorted to such a 
measure when victim to “severe violence.” Id. When victim to minor violence, both sexes 
requested time off at the rate of 4%. Id. In regard to having to resort to bed rest, of “severe 
violence” victims, 22.8% of women required one or more days in bed, compared to 13.8% of 
male victims. Id. at 158. The need for bed rest was also broken down by minor and severe 
violence to reveal that when the violence was minor, 15.2% of women and 12.8% of men 
needed bed rest. Id. at 159. Commenting on the results, the researchers observed that the 
higher rate of female reaction did not conclusively indicate that women suffered greater in-
jury. Id. at 158. Researchers cautioned that the data should be considered in conjunction 
with such factors as the lesser amount of humiliation suffered by women as opposed to 
men who are victims of domestic violence, as well as the relative ease in which women 
might be able to take time off from jobs which typically provided the family’s second, lower 
wage and a more flexible schedule. Id. at 154-64. On the stigma associated with being a 
male victim of domestic violence, see infra notes 183, 285 and accompanying text. 
 79. The study initially found that of non-victimized individuals, men and women dis-
proportionately displayed psychosomatic symptoms (26.8% of non-victimized women and 
15.9% of non-victimized men displaying psychosomatic symptoms). PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, 
supra note 14, at 158-59. When studying abused men and women, psychosomatic symp-
toms were positively correlated to increased levels of domestic abuse. Id. However, abused 
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 In addition to the higher risk of injury faced by abused women, 
the differing rates of injury also supply an argument for dismissing 
the statistical parity between the genders in their use of violence. 
Men are seen to possess the “single beating” advantage, as the mere 
threat of causing injury allows men to control women without physi-
cally having to raise a hand after the first beating.80 
D.   Responding to The Critics: Why Female                                 
Violence Must Be Examined 
 Acknowledging the damage differential in the domestic violence 
used by men and women may seem to end the need to study female 
violence.81 Yet does it? A number of important practical and theoreti-
cal justifications militate against ignoring female violence. First, 
notwithstanding the “damage differential,” some important norma-
tive observations about men and women can be drawn from an ac-
knowledgment of male and female violence. Given the statistical par-
ity in the use of domestic violence,82 there appears to be no basis for 
the traditional belief that women are either born or bred to be less 
physically aggressive than men. Likewise, the statistics do not bear 
out the “nagging” wife stereotype. Women are not more prone to en-
gage in verbal abuse than men.83 Moreover, the recognition of the dif-
ference in consequences between male and female violence does not 
diminish the fact that men and women bear similar intentions in re-
gard to their inclination to engage in intimate violence.84 In fact, 
their comparable intent leads to similar results when the physical 
strength difference between men and women is taken into account. 
Controlling for the “hand-to-hand” combat advantage of men by rely-
ing solely upon statistics measuring injury produced by domestic vio-
lence involving a weapon, the rate at which men are injured by 
                                                                                                                    
men and women showed no significant difference in the amount of symptoms suffered once 
the differences in such symptoms as experienced by non-abused individuals were taken 
into account. Id. at 164. 
 In terms of depression levels, non-victimized women were generally more depressed than 
men (20.9% of non-victimized women and 13.7% of non-victimized men evidencing depres-
sion). Id. at 160-61. Yet women became disproportionately more depressed than men upon 
the introduction of increasing levels of severe domestic violence, with 58.3% of severely 
abused women and 29.8% of severely abused men evidencing depression. Id. In terms of 
stress levels, non-victimized women experienced greater levels of stress than men (25.2% 
of non-victimized women vs. 15.2% of non-victimized men evidencing stress). Id. at 160. 
Minor violence did not disproportionately raise either sex’s stress levels. Id. Yet, once faced 
with severe violence, women became disproportionately more stressed than men (61.1% of 
severely abused women and 33.9% of severely abused men evidencing stress). Id. at 160. 
 80. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 42; see also Straus, supra note 14, at 446. 
 81. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 505 (discussing the idea of damage differential). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Ironically, statistical data reveals that men are as likely or more likely than 
women to engage in the “nagging” type verbal abuse. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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women is similar or greater than the rate at which women are in-
jured by men.85 Put succinctly by one commentator, “[a]pparently, it’s 
just a matter of style.”86 
 Second, focusing on the injury, rather than the assault, contra-
dicts the understood campaign against wife-beating which has been 
to end wife abuse per se, not just the violence which produces in-
jury.87 To support a domestic violence policy restricted only to injury-
produced violence would end the expectation of any legal response or 
social protection to noninjured victims.88 
 A third argument for resisting the effort to deny, defend, or mini-
mize female abuse of men lies in recognizing that the decrease in 
male abuse of women is largely credited to the attention which has 
been given to male abuse of women since the earliest explorations of 
domestic violence. Increased treatment and prevention programs, 
counseling for male abusers, and shelters for abused women are 
amongst other important items credited for the significant reductions 
in male abuse of women.89 Defining domestic violence as the abuse of 
women by men has brought a growing cultural intolerance for wife 
abuse, while there is reported to be little change in the tolerance of 
female violence.90 In very real terms then, the failure to stigmatize or 
                                                                                                                    
 85. Philip W. Cook, Female Violence Against Men Is a Serious Problem, in DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 25, 29 (Tamara L. Roleff ed., 2000). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Straus, supra note 50, at 69-70. 
 88. See FORD, supra note 35, at 23. 
 89. Other factors raised to explain reductions in male violence on women include 
changing family roles and improved economies. INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, supra 
note 14, at 79. For further discussion of the history of funding and attention given to wife 
and child abuse and its role in reducing the abuse of women and children, see id. at 19-39. 
For further discussion of treatment programs, see infra notes 234-35, 239, 241, 243, 258 
and accompanying text. For further discussion of shelters and victim services, see infra 
notes 235, 261, 263-76 and accompanying text. 
 90. The reported decline in the rates of male abuse of women and the lack of change 
in the rates of female abuse of men is matched by findings in attitudinal studies. In one 
study, data collected from four surveys over a twenty-six year period (from 1968 through 
1994) was compared to measure the change in cultural norms toward domestic violence. 
Each survey included two critical questions: (1) whether it was acceptable for a husband to 
hit a wife, and (2) whether it was acceptable for a wife to hit a husband. Murray A. Straus 
et al., Change in Cultural Norms Approving Marital Violence from 1968 to 1994, in OUT OF 
THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 3, 6 (Glenda Kauf-
man Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski eds., 1997). A comparison of the responses for the twenty-
six year survey period demonstrated that approval for a husband slapping a wife had “de-
creased sharply”—from 20% to 10% of all individuals (both men and women) approving 
such behavior. Id. at 7. By contrast, the approval given by both sexes for a wife slapping a 
husband remained “almost identical over the 26 years,” with little variance from the 20% 
approval figure measured in 1968 and again in 1994. Id. A breakdown of the approval 
rates by gender showed other similarities. Id. at 7-12. While approval rates for men slap-
ping women had decreased with both sexes, men were consistently found to be more ac-
cepting of such behavior. Id. at 12-13. Similarly, while approval rates for women slapping 
men remained constant with both sexes, men were consistently found to be more accepting 
of such behavior. Id.  
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even acknowledge the female abuse of men allows and encourages its 
continuation.91 
 The significant decreases in the use and approval of male violence, 
in drastic contrast to the lack of change in use or approval of female 
violence, has led researchers to what appears to be a self-evident 
conclusion. “[S]ocial movements condemning violence against women, 
legal and institutional reforms, and systemic antiviolence educa-
tional efforts can produce major changes in public attitudes about 
violence and should therefore be expanded.”92 However, even recom-
mending “zero tolerance of violence by both men and women” does 
not necessitate complete insensitivity to the greater risk of injury 
which female victims of domestic violence face.93 Yet an emphasis on 
the abuse of women by men is far different from demanding an ex-
clusive focus on such abuse to the preclusion of the abuse of men by 
women. Indeed, even if motivated solely by an interest in ending wife 
or child abuse, it is still necessary to address the various forms fam-
ily violence can take—including female violence. The abuse of men by 
women and the abuse of children by either parent are two forms of 
family violence which are directly related to any effort to systemati-
cally address wife abuse.94 Consequently, a fourth argument for ac-
knowledging and addressing the abuse of men by women is that it 
will ultimately work to end the abuse of women by men. Put in blunt 
utilitarian terms, female violence must be addressed in order to pro-
tect women as a man provoked by a violent female has the potential 
to inflict greater injury.95 
 This argument is somewhat controversial because the demand for 
self-control is placed solely on the female and seems tantamount to 
victim-blaming.96 Such an objection may legitimately refute any ar-
                                                                                                                    
 91. See supra notes 20-22, 24-27, 30-32, 35, 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing 
the changing rates of violence per gender over time). 
 92. Straus et al., supra note 90, at 14. 
 93. Id. 
 94. For a discussion of the relation of wife abuse to other family violence, see STRAUS 
ET AL., supra note 12, at 97-122. For a recognition of the many other forms of family vio-
lence, see infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text. 
 95. Straus, supra note 50, at 79. For a discussion of the differences in the injury 
caused by abusive men and women, see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Morse, supra note 59, at 252. In this respect, addressing the abuse of men by 
women in order to protect women from further abuse is similar to the “victim-blaming” 
criticisms which were levied at the early efforts to address the abuse of women by target-
ing the (non-violent) actions taken by female victims believed to trigger male violence. For 
various discussions of victim-blaming, see, for example, DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 8, 
at 159-60 (cautioning against allowing the public to blame victims of violence); DONALD G. 
DUTTON, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 26 (1995); V. MICHAEL MCKENZIE, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1995) (acknowledging domestic violence victim self-
blaming ability); Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, in DO 
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 98, 101 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 
1996) (recognizing victims’ assumption of guilt for beatings suffered and batterers’ contri-
bution to such feelings). 
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gument raised to look at female violence in order to protect women. 
However, this type of controversy does not prevent recognizing the 
effect of husband-beating on children. Regardless of the gender of the 
child or the violent parent, children who witness the violence of one 
parent on another are more likely to be violent in their adult rela-
tionships.97 These findings therefore provide the basis for a fifth rea-
son for supporting a gender-neutral effort to address spousal vio-
lence. Witnessing either husband-beating or wife-beating as a child is 
equally likely to breed a predisposition toward intimate violence.98 
 Finally, a wider look at family violence that includes an aware-
ness of husband-beating will also allow a greater emphasis to be 
placed on the socio-cultural factors which teach violent tendencies.99 
Male-blaming can no longer be relied upon as the single explanation 
for the ills of society. 
 From such an array of reasons for addressing female violence, it 
may seem that no one should be against such an endeavor. Some 
reason should appeal to everyone. Acknowledging female violence ar-
guably not only will protect men, but it will ultimately work to pro-
tect women and children. Social causes of family violence also seem 
more likely to be given serious attention. Moreover, an effort to ad-
dress actions, rather than injury, maintains the integrity of tradi-
tional domestic violence policy. What then is the harm in targeting, 
discussing, or even revealing the abuse of men by women? Why has 
such abuse not been “explode[d]” in the manner Catherine 
MacKinnon demands the abuse of women by men must be treated?100 
Why does the denial continue? 
 Although the reactions against examining female violence may 
vary, the critics share key theoretical and practical motives which 
are often intertwined. It is these motives that not only account for 
the vehement rejection of efforts to study female violence (unless it is 
couched in the language of self-defense), but are also responsible for 
shaping our legal, cultural and social policies and norms on domestic 
violence. Looking at the development of domestic violence theory is 
                                                                                                                    
 97. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 99-101. 
 98. While such discussion is beyond the context of this Article’s focus on husband-
beating, it must be noted that the direct abuse of children is also directly linked to spousal 
abuse. For example, people who experience the most physical punishment as teenagers are 
four times more likely to be wife-beaters or husband-beaters than those not physically 
abused. Id. at 110. For further discussion of the childhood victimization of adult abusers 
and its creating a predisposition toward family violence, see Lee H. Bowker et al., On the 
Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE 
ABUSE, supra note 55, at 158.  
 99. Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 507. For discussion of the need to move away from 
male-bashing explanations in order to both further social progress and legitimize femi-
nism, see infra Part V. 
 100. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 100 (1987). 
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the foundation for exploring such explanations and their implica-
tions. 
III.   THE EXPLANATIONS 
A.   Female Violence: A Theoretical Threat 
1.   The Development of the Patriarchal Definition  
of Domestic Violence 
 The “discovery” of domestic violence is credited to the battered 
women who came forward in the 1970s and began telling their sto-
ries in the new female focused community centers of England.101 Of 
course, violence against women was certainly not a new phenome-
non. It had not only been previously recognized, but also, on a spo-
radic and brief occasion, been delegitimized.102 However, it is the 
1970s’ attention to the domestic violence suffered by women which 
marked the beginning of the current effort to eradicate domestic vio-
lence. Consequently, it is this identification of domestic violence as a 
woman’s issue that shapes today’s understanding of domestic vio-
lence. Because of this background, the definition of domestic violence 
has developed as the use of physical power by men against women 
not motivated simply by a desire to inflict physical pain or even emo-
tional suffering but rather as part of a larger effort by men to gain 
and maintain control over women. 
 While such a definition may now be accepted without question, 
the characterization of the male as sole user of physical force and the 
female as sole recipient was revolutionary in several important re-
spects.103 Recognizing domestic violence as a social phenomenon, the 
male as batterer/female as victim perspective largely dispelled ear-
lier understandings of domestic violence as an illness suffered by 
both the batterer and the victim.104 From this medical perspective, a 
                                                                                                                    
 101. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 8, at 1-3; see also ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL 
PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO BATTER: THE DULUTH MODEL 173 (1993). 
 102. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 8, at 3 (noting the “fleeting” focus on domestic vio-
lence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 103. As Lenore Walker described: 
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful 
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do some-
thing he wants her to do without any concern for her rights. Battered women 
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationships with men. Fur-
thermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go 
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an 
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she re-
mains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman. 
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xv (1979). 
 104. This sociological treatment of domestic violence is recognized to have coincided 
with the general growth of sociology and the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Yllö, 
supra note 52, at 50. 
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batterer’s use of domestic violence had been explained as the product 
of illness.105 Likewise, a victim’s inability to leave a battering rela-
tionship was understood as a manifestation of her own masochistic or 
pathological nature.106 Reacting to this limiting, medical jargon, an 
alternative definition of domestic violence was eventually found in 
Lenore Walker’s “cycle of violence,” with its ongoing pattern of ten-
sion building, acute battering and batterer contrition.107 The recogni-
tion that a battered woman may stay in an abusive relationship for 
legitimate reasons including love, concern for her children, and fear 
of heightened violence upon separation was also welcomed as it fur-
ther encouraged an end to victim blaming.108 
                                                                                                                    
 105. For a discussion of the early treatment of male battering as an illness and the 
gradual move from medical definitions to more sociological understandings of domestic vio-
lence, see DUTTON, supra note 96, at 61-77; DANIEL JAY SONKIN ET AL., THE MALE 
BATTERER: A TREATMENT APPROACH (1985); WALKER, supra note 103, at 205-50; see also 
infra note 106. 
 106. While much work has been done to correct these medical misconceptions, battered 
women remain subject to a host of overly simplified characterizations ranging from help-
less victim to violence provocateur. For a recognition of the early medical stereotyping of 
battered women and its persistence today, see Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Vio-
lence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 343-
44 (1995); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1882-85 (1996); Joan S. Meier, Notes from 
the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in 
Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1301-02 (1993). 
 107. For the gradual development in understanding battered women from pathological 
and sadistic to more sociological definitions, see OLA W. BARNETT & ALYCE D. LAVIOLETTE, 
IT COULD HAPPEN TO ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY 65-92 (2d ed. 2000); WALKER, 
supra note 103, at 18-54. 
 
 108. The myriad of reasons a domestic violence victim remains in the relationship has 
been widely discussed. For a discussion of the emotional difficulty in leaving due to an on-
going love for the batterer as well as the shame associated with leaving and publicly dis-
closing the relationship’s violent nature, see, for example, DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 
8, at 145-46; WALKER, supra note 103, at 27 (recognizing the love which is restored during 
periods of contrition in the cycle of violence); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Panel Presen-
tation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 891, 893 (1995) (acknowledging that a victim 
of abuse does not want to leave, but simply wants the violence to stop); Martha R. Ma-
honey, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1991) (acknowledging her reluctance to tell her own story). 
 On the fear of separation assault, see, for example, Mahoney, supra (addressing the fear 
of separation assault). For further discussion of separation assault, see infra notes 138,  
169 and accompanying text. 
 On the victim’s concerns regarding the children’s physical safety and emotional well-
being if removed from an abusive home, see DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 8, at 148 (rec-
ognizing children are cited as the most common reason a battered woman stays in a rela-
tionship); Mahoney, supra, at 19 (recognizing that a mother’s decision-making process in-
cludes calculating her spouse’s and children’s interests); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dia-
lectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
589, 614-15 (1986) (recognizing that a woman’s connected nature tends to result in her 
making decisions regarding her own welfare in connection with consideration of her chil-
dren’s and spouse’s interests). 
 On the economic issues associated with leaving, see CATHERINE T. KENNEY & KAREN R. 
BROWN, NOW LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES: THE IMPACT OF 
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 While such work appreciably advanced our understanding of do-
mestic violence, its ongoing focus on the physical aspect of domestic 
violence was soon criticized as secondary to the need to focus on the 
patriarchal dynamics surrounding the use of violence.109 Such a per-
spective would properly emphasize that domestic violence “is not 
gender neutral any more than the economic division of labor or the 
institution of marriage is gender neutral.”110 Replacing the cycle of 
violence, the “power and control” wheel provided a better means of 
depicting the gender driven nature of domestic violence and empha-
sized that physical violence formed only a part, albeit an important 
one, in the patriarchal scheme.111 From a central hub of power and 
control, the wheel’s outer rim is formed by a circle of physical and 
sexual violence. This central power is then connected to the outer use 
of violence through spokes identified with such additional forces as 
using children, minimizing, denying, blaming, isolating, relying upon 
male privilege, coercing, threatening, intimidating, and abusing both 
                                                                                                                    
VIOLENCE ON POOR WOMEN (1996); Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting 
Women’s Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141 (1995).  
 On the cultural and racial concerns which complicate a decision to leave, see Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). That similar reasoning may also explain 
the decision of male victims of violence to remain has also been specifically recognized. 
Cook, supra note 85, at 30 (arguing the male victims’ concerns regarding child custody); 
Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 507. Instead of explaining the victim’s reaction, others have 
emphasized the need to focus on the perpetrator. See Hanna, supra note 106, at 1879-80; 
Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 303, 305 (1997). 
 109. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 28-34 (criticizing the physical definition of physical 
violence given by such individuals as Lenore Walker, Mary Ann Douglas, Angela Browne, 
and Mildred Pagelow); id. at 53-55 (criticizing legal literature’s failure to focus on the 
“power and control, domination and subordination” dimensions of domestic violence as a 
result of the “traditional” acceptance of male domination); Meier, supra note 106, at 1317-
22 (discussing the development of the patriarchal dynamics of domestic violence); see also 
G. Chezia Carraway, Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1305-06 
(1991) (advancing the patriarchal definition of domestic violence as part of an overall effort 
to redefine violence against women of color in order to include “economic violence, cultural 
violence, legislative violence, medical violence, spiritual violence, emotional violence, and 
educational violence”). 
 The importance of social forces is likewise recognized by the family researchers in their 
study of both male and family violence. However, while acknowledging the patriarchal 
condition, their thrust is upon how socioeconomic forces can cause both men and women to 
behave violently. The external factors affecting both sexes include poor economic and em-
ployment conditions, as well as the social and media condonation of violence, racism, and 
sexism. See, e.g., INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 194-206; THE SOCIAL CAUSES OF 
HUSBAND-WIFE VIOLENCE (Murray A. Straus & Gerald T. Hotaling eds., 1980); STRAUS ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 123-52. 
 110. Yllö, supra note 52, at 54. 
 111. The “power and control wheel” is part of the “Duluth Model” developed by the Du-
luth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) in Duluth, Minnesota. PENCE & PAYMAR, 
supra note 101, at 1-15. For further discussion of the critical impact of the “power and con-
trol wheel” on the treatment of domestic violence, see infra notes 247-55 and accompanying 
text. 
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emotionally and economically.112 In combination, such tactics allow 
the wheel of power and control to be spun by men in their efforts to 
control women.113 Violence, then, is not simply the male use of physi-
cal violence against women. Through the power and control wheel, 
domestic violence can more broadly be described as the male “way of 
‘doing power’ in a relationship; battering is power and control 
marked by violence and coercion.”114 Such a framework also allows 
for the controlling effects of the violence on women and the pervasive 
use of violence as a patriarchal tool to be highlighted. “A battered 
woman is a woman who experiences the violence against her as de-
termining or controlling her thoughts, emotions, or actions, including 
her efforts to cope with the violence itself. Many, many women ex-
perience such violence in our society.”115 
2.   Challenging Domestic Violence, Challenging Feminism 
(a)   Through Theory 
 Beyond serving as merely an academic change, the widespread ac-
ceptance of this association of domestic violence with male power and 
control has critical consequences for society’s treatment of domestic 
violence.116 These very tangible results form an important part of this 
                                                                                                                    
 112. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 3. 
 113. Id. at 1-15; see also Yllö, supra note 52, at 54-55. 
 114. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 93. 
 115. Id. 
 116. For a sampling of works from the volumes of entire books, chapters and articles 
explicitly devoted to the patriarchal use of domestic violence or male violence, see, for ex-
ample, BARNETT & LAVIOLETTE, supra note 107; R. EMERSON DOBASH ET AL., CHANGING 
VIOLENT MEN (2000); DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 8; DONALD G. DUTTON, THE 
DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 
(UBC Press 1995); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 55; JEAN GILES-
SIMS, WIFE BATTERING: A SYSTEMS THEORY APPROACH (1983); JERRY M. GOFFMAN, SELF-
HELP COUNSELING FOR MEN WHO BATTER WOMEN (1983); EDWARD W. GONDOLF & DAVID 
M. RUSSELL, MAN TO MAN: A GUIDE FOR MEN IN ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1987); EDWARD 
W. GONDOLF, MEN WHO BATTER: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 
(1985); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW 
INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); EDWARD JUKES, MEN WHO BATTER 
WOMEN (1999); LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 
(N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993); MACKINNON, supra note 100, at 85-92; PENCE & PAYMAR, supra 
note 101; ANSON SHUPE ET AL., VIOLENT MEN, VIOLENT COUPLES: THE DYNAMICS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1987); SONKIN ET AL., supra note 105; RICHARD A. STORDEUR & 
RICHARD STILLE, ENDING MEN’S VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR PARTNERS: ONE ROAD TO PEACE 
(1989); WALKER, supra note 103; DAVID B. WEXLER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2000: AN 
INTEGRATED SKILLS PROGRAM FOR MEN: GROUP LEADER’S MANUAL (2000); WOMAN 
BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES (Michael Steinman ed., 1991); Cynthia Grant Bowman, 
The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201 (1992); 
Donald G. Dutton & James J. Browning, Power Struggles and Intimacy Anxieties as 
Causative Factors of Wife Assault, in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 163 (Gordon 
W. Russell ed., 1988); Ruth E. Fleury, Missing Voices: Patterns of Battered Women’s Satis-
faction with the Criminal Legal System, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 181 (2002); Carol 
Gregory & Edna Erez, The Effects of Batterer Intervention Programs: The Battered 
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discussion.117 However, before discussing the impact of the definition, 
it is important to remain at the theoretical level for a moment longer 
in order to fully grasp why there is such resistance to acknowledging 
female violence. Domestic violence is not viewed as just another tool 
used by men in the subordination of women. Rather, it is considered 
“one of the most brutal and explicit expressions of patriarchical 
domination.”118 Such strong roots in patriarchy have produced an 
equally strong force against accepting female violence. Acknowledg-
ing female violence risks negating the very basis of the existing do-
mestic violence definition. 
 The consequences for domestic violence theory, however, are only 
a small part of a much larger threat. Domestic violence represents 
the prized gemstone of feminist theory’s fundamental message that 
our legal, social, and cultural norms are fashioned in a manner which 
permit men to engage in a constant and pervasive effort to oppress 
women by any and every available means. A successful challenge to 
the patriarchal definition of domestic violence may thus undermine 
feminism itself. To remain true to feminist theory, no aspect of male-
female relations can be considered without first accepting the male 
as all powerful and the female as powerless.119 The gender hierarchy 
is omnipresent.120 
(b)   Through Methodology 
 Given this dynamic, the suggestion that women may rely upon 
physical violence for anything other than self-defense must be re-
jected. However, the implications of grounding domestic violence in 
feminist theory go beyond prohibiting any consideration of female 
violence. Feminist theory also provides the means for discrediting 
                                                                                                                    
Women’s Perspectives, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 206 (2002); Kurz, supra note 53; 
Mahoney, supra note 108; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Making Reconceptualization of Violence 
Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245 (1995); Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It A Crime: 
Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032 
(1996); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). See also supra note 8 and infra notes 254, 294 (noting other sources 
devoted to a patriarchal understanding of domestic violence). 
 117. While the definition permeates our legal, social, and medical institutions, I have 
focused within this Article on discussing the practical effects such definition has upon the 
criminal justice system (particularly on arrest, prosecution, punishment, and victim ser-
vices). See infra notes 144-290 and accompanying text. 
 118. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 8, at ix. 
 119. MACKINNON, supra note 100, at 170. 
 120. As one feminist acknowledged: 
[F]rom a feminist perspective, sexism is not just a factor in domestic violence. 
For feminists, gender is one of the fundamental organizing principles of society. 
It is a social relation that enters into and partially constitutes all other social 
relations and activities, and pervades the entire social context in which a per-
son lives. 
Kurz, supra note 53, at 97. 
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any methodology employed to demonstrate the existence of female 
violence. By relying upon the definition of domestic violence as a pa-
triarchal tool of control, any methodology which is not similarly 
grounded within this contextual framework can be rejected outright. 
Specifically, studies categorized as quantitative are deemed “inher-
ently patriarchal” and therefore invalid because their dependence 
upon scientific, empirical data does not account for the history and 
context of male domination over women.121 By contrast, qualitative 
studies that depend upon a more clinical approach (which include the 
personal, in-depth interviewing of battered women) are considered to 
yield more accurate findings because of their fundamental commit-
ment to a feminist perspective of domestic violence.122 
 At the risk of being an overly-crude distinction, the qualita-
tive/quantitative dichotomy in the sociological study of domestic vio-
lence explains the criticisms of various CTS and non-CTS empirical 
studies which have reported on the violence of women.123 However, at 
a deeper level, the divide can also be appreciated as a predictable re-
sult of the liberal-feminist tension which cuts across all fields of 
study. Qualitative research easily links with liberalism and its com-
mitment to neutral principles and abstract rules on the one hand, 
while quantitative research adheres to feminism and its emphasis 
upon personal relations and context on the other.124 The feminist so-
ciologist’s critique of objective, positivist research as providing 
                                                                                                                    
 121. Kersti Yllö, Political and Methodological Debates in Wife Abuse Research, in FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 55, at 31. 
 122. Having relied upon both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the study of 
domestic violence, sociologist Kersti Yllö speaks authoritatively on the philosophical divi-
sion and argues for extracting and combining the strengths of each method. Her work in-
cludes, for example, a quantitative study demonstrating the relation between domestic vio-
lence and the social, economic, political and legal status of women. Id. at 30-36. 
 123. Like any simplistic distinction, a certain overlap between the quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies already exists through, for example, the quantitative study’s re-
liance upon personal interviews and existence of researcher biases and the qualitative 
study’s inevitable dependence on numeric data and objectifying of interviewees. See id. at 
39-48 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches in domestic violence 
work). 
 124. For a variety of studies comparing liberalism and feminism, see, for example, 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 635 (1983) (arguing for an outright 
replacement of liberal thought with feminist theory); Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” 
Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 
(1992) (finding many strands of feminism within liberalism); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Pri-
ority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 363 (1996) 
(criticizing liberalism’s facially neutral themes of liberty, equality, and privacy as mecha-
nisms for supporting white supremacy); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Juris-
prudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986) (proposing an evolution from liberalism to 
feminism); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) (arguing for the integration of liberalism and feminism); 
Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990) (advocating an inte-
gration approach to liberalism and feminism). 
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“methodological tickets to scientific respectability but deliver[ing] in-
tellectual blinkers and mindless adherence to sterile sophistication” 
while failing to account for the experiences of women125 resonates in 
the charges of radical legal feminist Catherine MacKinnon. “Liberal 
legalism is . . . a medium for making male dominance both invisible 
and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same 
time as it enforces that view on society.”126 
 Once this connection between research methods, definitions of 
domestic violence, and philosophical perspectives is made, the esca-
lating costs to feminist theory can be well understood. However, the 
costs become even more real when the practical impact is included in 
the calculus. Defining domestic violence beyond the threat to women 
is seen in and of itself as a threat to women’s lives. 
B.   Female Violence: A Practical Threat 
1.   Financial Concerns 
 For real-world domestic violence advocates, defining domestic vio-
lence as a woman’s problem is a practical, not an academic, decision. 
In a world of infinite problems but finite resources, competition for 
adequate attention and funding is terrific. Recognition demands pri-
oritization. By limiting the definition of domestic violence to male 
violence, domestic violence advocates have been able to frame the is-
sue in a manner narrow and sympathetic enough for it to remain 
high on the public agenda. Broadening the definition to include fe-
male violence risks diluting the effectiveness of domestic violence 
funding campaigns, as female violence as well as male violence would 
then have to be targeted with, presumably, the same fixed amount of 
money.127 As the commentators honestly explain, given the “fierce 
competition” for funding,  
[i]f we acknowledge the existence of battered husbands, then the 
funding designated for programs to assist battered women will be 
cut further because monies will be directed at programs for bat-
tered men. Thus, many radical feminists have fought for years to 
keep battered husbands closeted so that the small amount of 
money that was available for wife abuse would not be jeopard-
ized.128 
                                                                                                                    
 125. Yllö, supra note 121, at 45 (quoting R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, The 
Context-Specific Approach, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE 
RESEARCH 261, 263 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983)). 
 126. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE 610, 610 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993). 
 127. Kurz, supra note 53, at 99 (recognizing that perceiving women as batterers would 
require diverting money from battered women’s programs in order to assist battered men). 
 128. INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 188. 
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 Arguably, such practical consequences may be so great that even 
those willing to accept the violent tendencies of women may legiti-
mately favor concentrating on the battered woman’s cause. The se-
verity of the injuries suffered by battered women and the subordi-
nate position traditionally held by women in the family are justifi-
able priorities.129 However, emphasizing the battered woman’s cause 
over the issue of battered men is far different than the current strat-
egy that, instead, focuses on battered women by denying the exis-
tence of battered men. Practical motivations for denying the possibil-
ity of female violence altogether become more complicated. 
2.   Marketing Dilemmas 
 In domestic violence circles, the image of a battered woman as a 
helpless victim is routinely disavowed as overly simplistic and failing 
to account for the multitude of strengths shown by victims of vio-
lence.130 However, notwithstanding such theoretical posturing, the 
“helpless victim” stereotype remains very much a part of the common 
understanding of domestic violence and continues to fit well within 
the feminists’ overriding message of woman as subordinate.131 A 
woman’s ability to act aggressively challenges this simplicity.132 Con-
sequently, when it comes to funding, battered women advocates are 
                                                                                                                    
 129. As one of the authors of the CTS studies remarked:  
Most people feel that social policy should be aimed at helping those who are in 
the weakest position. Even though wives are also violent, they are in the 
weaker, more vulnerable position in respect to violence in the family. This ap-
plies to both the physical, psychological, and economic aspects of things. 
STRAUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 44.  
 For a comparison of the injuries suffered by men and women and the general acknowl-
edgment that the injuries suffered by battered women are greater than those suffered by 
battered men, see supra Part II.C. 
 130. Kurz, supra note 53, at 99. 
 The helpless victim stereotype of battered women is built upon the notion of learned 
helplessness which suggests that a battered woman is unable to leave a violent relation-
ship because she has been conditioned, over time, to be weak and passive in order to sur-
vive. 
 On learned helplessness, see BARNETT & LAVIOLETTE, supra note 107, at 15-38, 117-38; 
EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988); WALKER, supra note 103, at 
45-48. For a recognition of the problems raised by stereotypes of domestic violence, see 
Cahn & Meier, supra note 106, at 346-54; Hanna, supra note 106, at 1882-85.  
 131. As part of her critique of the CTS studies, Yllö holds the studies’ researchers ac-
countable for damaging the feminist agenda by releasing their findings. She openly argues 
that, as sociologists committed to ending domestic violence, they should have foreseen the 
controversy such statistics would unleash. In contrast to their non-contextual approach, 
Yllö openly praises feminists whose commitment to helping women determines what ideas 
and arguments are released into the “marketplace of ideas.” Yllö, supra note 121, at 42. 
 132. Recognizing that a woman’s ability to act violently does not refute the reality that 
women are battered is central to the challenge of acknowledging the violent capacities of 
women. For a discussion of how both the violent behaviors of men and women should be 
acknowledged and addressed, see infra Part V. 
822  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:791 
 
willing to promote a stereotype which, in other contexts, is readily 
recognized as inaccurate. 
3.   Vindictive Possibilities 
 Sympathetic to the interest in protecting women who are more 
likely than men to suffer injury, perhaps this strategic depiction of 
“woman as victim” has justification. However, not every motivation 
may be understood as so sincere. At least one author has argued that 
the treatment of female violence by feminists—be it to deny, defend, 
or minimize—is not a complicated matter at all. Rather, it is purely 
an act of revenge. Angry over a history of domination, feminists have 
discredited female violence in order to give women a secret way to 
strike back. From this perspective, the critiques of female violence 
are “not feminist critiques, but justifications of violence by women in 
the guise of feminism.”133 
IV.   LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
A.   Academic 
 From theoretical concerns, to financial and marketing strategies, 
to perhaps even vindictive desires, the treatment of domestic violence 
as yet another, if not the central, manifestation of our patriarchal so-
ciety, has had definite social implications.134 Given the natural im-
pact of social norms on legal institutions, it is not surprising to find 
that the patriarchal definition of domestic violence has had a perva-
sive influence upon our legal system. Feminist scholars in the legal 
arena, like their counterparts in the social arena, have labored to 
identify and eradicate the law’s perpetuation of female oppression. 
Defining the law’s approach to domestic violence, as well as such is-
sues as pornography, sexual harassment, and rape within the patri-
archal framework, legal feminists share the more socially-oriented 
feminists’ objective of addressing each issue not simply as an iso-
lated, unique phenomenon, but rather as part of an overarching 
scheme to eradicate the gender hierarchy and to empower women.135 
The patriarchal definition of domestic violence is integral to such a 
vision. 
 The domestic violence as gender violence characterization under-
lies the full array of legal scholarship on domestic violence. In prac-
tice-oriented scholarship, the patriarchal understanding of domestic 
violence is championed as a means of sharpening lawyering skills.136 
                                                                                                                    
 133. Straus, supra note 50, at 83. 
 134. See supra Part III.B (discussing such social motivations). 
 135. MACKINNON, supra note 100, at 22. 
 136. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 106, at 1325 (encouraging the adoption of an interdis-
ciplinary approach in law school domestic violence clinics through the integration of psy-
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In more theoretical scholarship, the patriarchal definition is urged as 
a means of shaping substantive legal issues. For example, the patri-
archal definition is critical to distinguish criminal violence from the 
self-defense theory of battered women’s syndrome.137 Building upon 
the self-defense theory for women who kill, Professor Mahoney’s 
work on separation assault illustrates the fundamental male-power 
definition of domestic violence. Relying upon the separation assault 
theory and its realization of the greater risk of violence associated 
with leaving one’s abuser, Mahoney explains a woman’s use of vio-
lence not as a choice, but rather as the only means of escape.138 Ma-
honey’s separation assault theory defends women who resort to vio-
lence while providing a strong response to the ever-persistent ques-
tion, “Why doesn’t she just leave?”139 Understanding domestic vio-
lence as simply another patriarchal means of “doing power” with the 
family, battered women are without the power to leave.140 Conse-
quently, separation assault and its use in explaining battered women 
self-defense theories fits well within the subordination continuum 
experienced by women on account of our patriarchal familial and so-
cial structures.141 
 Yet legal literature and its influence on such issues as battered 
woman’s syndrome is only one small example of the influence of 
feminist domestic violence theory on the law. Genderizing the use of 
domestic violence is openly and widely promoted as the means of 
achieving greater legal redress for battered wives from a full range of 
legal contexts.142 A critical examination of the criminal response to 
                                                                                                                    
chological and legal perspectives of domestic violence as a instrument of male power); Jane 
C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence 
Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993) (arguing for the greater use of narratives 
about women and people of color in the domestic violence arena in order to bring legal and 
social reform). 
 137. For a sampling of the literature linking the battered woman’s syndrome and the 
male use of domestic violence, see WALKER, supra note 64, at 55-70; Meier, supra note 106, 
at 1316-17; Walker, supra note 64. For an earlier discussion of battered woman’s syndrome 
and its lack of statistical support from domestic violence studies see, supra notes 64-69 and 
accompanying text. 
 138. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 65-66: 
Separation assault is the attack on the woman’s body and volition in which her 
partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force 
her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she 
will live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relationship. It is 
an attempt to gain, retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the 
woman for ending the relationship. It often takes place over time. 
 139. For further discussion of the reasons women are traditionally seen as unable to 
leave a violent relationship, see MCKENZIE, supra note 96, at 53; Meier, supra note 106, at 
1317-18. 
 140. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 93-94. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Such goals run the gamut—from the development of pro-arrest policies for male 
offenders, to increased criminal prosecutions of wife-beaters, to the provision of civil pro-
tective orders for battered wives, to criminal sanctions for violations of such orders, and to 
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domestic violence quickly reveals the success of such efforts. From 
the arrest, prosecution, and punishment of batterers, to the services 
offered to victims, all aspects of our legal response to domestic vio-
lence attest that domestic violence is controlled by a feminist state.143 
B.   The Feminist State Of Domestic Violence 
1.   Arrest 
(a)   The Development of Arrest Policies and Theories: The 
Minneapolis Experiment and U.S. Attorney General’s Report 
 When domestic violence first began to receive public attention, 
mediation prevailed as the standard police response.144 Arrest, at 
least in the misdemeanor context, was the tool of “last resort.”145 Yet, 
recognizing that the power differential typically associated with do-
mestic violence made mediation completely ineffective, by the late 
1970s, women’s advocacy groups began lobbying for greater use of ar-
rest.146 Today, while arrest is still not the predominant response, 
every state has adopted laws and policies which endorse the greater 
use of arrest.147 
                                                                                                                    
a heightened concern for domestic violence in custody cases. Meier, supra note 106, at 
1304; see also EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE (2d ed. 1996); DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra 
note 96. For a critique of the one gender dimensional understanding of domestic violence 
and its impact on our social, legal, and cultural institutions, see infra Part IV.B. 
 143. Certainly, domestic violence and its treatment are grappled with in civil contexts 
(such as child custody, alimony, civil restraining orders, and tort liability), as well as in a 
much wider variety of criminal issues (including spousal testimonial privileges and self-
defense theories) and in non-legal contexts (such as medical care). However, for the pur-
pose of writing a manageable article, I have chosen to focus on these four basic criminal 
matters. For feminist coverage on this broader range of issues, see generally, BUZAWA & 
BUZAWA, supra note 142 (addressing a variety of criminal law contexts influenced by do-
mestic violence); CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE 
LAW (2001) (providing legal textbook coverage of a range of domestic violence issues); 
NANCY K.D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW (1996) (covering domestic violence issues in 
a law school text); Demie Kurz & Evan Stark, Not-So-Benign Neglect: The Medical Re-
sponse to Battering, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 55, at 249 (dis-
cussing the medical community’s response to domestic violence); Meier, supra note 106 
(promoting the use of feminist advocacy skills when representing victims of domestic vio-
lence); Seymore, supra note 116 (discussing the conflict of spousal immunity provisions 
and domestic violence). 
 144. Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law: Evaluat-
ing Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 
(1992). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. The breadth of such laws varies widely. By 1992, fifteen states and Washington, 
D.C. had moved to enact mandatory arrest laws in all probable cause incidents. Janell D. 
Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence, in DO ARRESTS 
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 96, at 43, 44. In other jurisdictions, while ar-
rest is not mandatory, it is often encouraged as the “preferred response.” Such develop-
ments are often accompanied by the abolition of the “in-presence” requirement for arrest in 
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 While the lobbying efforts of women’s groups clearly influenced 
this development, the occurrence of three events in 1984 are often 
credited as being directly responsible for producing the dramatic 
turnaround in police response to domestic violence. The year was 
marked by the publication of the Minneapolis Experiment findings,148 
the release of the U.S. Attorney General’s Family Violence Task 
Force recommendations,149 and the decision in Thurman v. City of 
Torrington.150 None of these three events conclusively found that ar-
rest deters or prevents domestic violence. However, in unique ways, 
each event was nevertheless relied upon to promote arrest as the 
least costly response to domestic violence. 
 In studying the effectiveness of arrest as used by police in Min-
neapolis, the Minneapolis Experiment suggested that arrest served 
as a real deterrent to domestic violence.151 Based on their findings, 
the researchers recommended the adoption of warrantless arrest by 
all states and the presumption in favor of arrest as standard police 
                                                                                                                    
the event of misdemeanor domestic violence such as simple assault and battery. David 
Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, The Relative Effects of Offense, Offender, and Victim Vari-
ables on the Decision to Prosecute Domestic Violence Cases, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
46, 47 (2001); Sherman, supra note 144, at 15. By 1998, all fifty states authorized war-
rantless arrest for when probable cause exists to show that a misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence act has occurred or that a restraining order has been violated. Cheryl Hanna, The 
Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1505, 1518 n.46 (1998). For a general discussion of changing arrest policies from 1970 
to 1990, see Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992). 
 148. For the original report on the Minneapolis Experiment, see Lawrence W. Sherman 
& Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. 
SOC. REV. 261 (1984). 
 149. ATT’Y GEN. TASK FORCE ON FAM. VIOLENCE: FINAL REP. (1984). For further dis-
cussion, see infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 150. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). For a recognition of the combined influence of 
these events, see, for example, Nancy Egan, The Police Response to Spouse Abuse: A Selec-
tive, Annotated Bibliography, 91 LAW LIBR. J. 499, 502 (1999); Hanna, supra note 106, at 
1859. 
 151. The study was based upon 314 cases in which the Minneapolis police had probable 
cause to believe that an incident of misdemeanor domestic violence had occurred. 
Sherman, supra note 144, at 18. However, rather than arresting in all cases, the study re-
lied upon a lottery system in which police were randomly required to respond by either ar-
resting the suspect, advising the parties, or sending the suspect away from the home upon 
threat of arrest. Id. at 16. In a six month follow up period, about 10% of the arrested sus-
pects as compared to roughly 20% of the non-arrested suspects were reported to the police 
as having committed another act of domestic violence. Id. at 19. While not statistically sig-
nificant, the roughly 20% of the non-arrested suspects who committed another act of do-
mestic violence broke down to 19% of the advised suspects and 24% of the suspects who 
were sent away from the home. Id. 
 For the original report on the Minneapolis Experiment, see Sherman & Berk, supra note 
148. For other later discussions, see Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of 
Research on Legal Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 117 (1989). 
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policy.152 However, the researchers also recognized the limited nature 
of their study. They cautioned against mandatory arrest and encour-
aged replication studies.153 Five replication studies ultimately fol-
lowed and were much more equivocal on the effectiveness of arrest as 
a domestic violence deterrent.154 Yet the replication studies had little 
practical impact. Ignoring the skepticism of the original experiment’s 
authors and without waiting for the further studies, the U.S. Attor-
ney General released his recommendation in favor of warrantless ar-
rest and arrest as the “preferred response” within four months of the 
Minneapolis Experiment.155 
 The Minneapolis Experiment and the replication studies were 
evenly divided in their results—one half finding arrest to be a deter-
rent and the other half finding arrest to be a promoter of domestic 
violence.156 However, even the studies’ full release and review did lit-
tle to sway many domestic violence advocates from their seemingly 
intuitive commitment to some policy of mandatory, presumptive, or 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Sherman, supra note 144, at 21-22. For discussion of the eventual adoption of 
warrantless arrest by all the states, see Hanna, supra note 147, at 1518 n.46. See also su-
pra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing state developments in arrest policies). 
 153. Sherman, supra note 144, at 21-22. 
 154. Like the Minneapolis Experiment, the replication studies were also sponsored by 
the National Institute of Justice. Id. at 25. The five studies were conducted in Milwaukee, 
Omaha, Charlotte, Colorado Springs, and Miami (Metro-Dade). Only the two experiments 
undertaken in Colorado Springs and Miami concluded that arrest had a deterrent effect as 
the original experiment had found. Id. at 25, 32. The Milwaukee, Omaha, and Charlotte 
studies found that arrest correlated with an escalation in violence. Id. at 25. For a brief 
comparison of the initial Minneapolis Experiment, with the five replication studies and 
their varying methodologies, see JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 13-15 (1996); Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 147, at 
46; Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 222-38 (1992); Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 147, at 44-52; Sherman, 
supra note 144, at 25.  
 For individual discussions of the five replication studies, see Richard A. Berk et al., A 
Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992) (on the Colorado Springs experiment); Franklyn W. Dunford, The 
Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spouse Assault, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 120 
(1992) (on the Omaha experiment); J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, III, Female 
Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73 (1992) (on the Charlotte experiment); Anthony M. Pate & 
Edwin E. Hamilton, Formal and Informal Deterrents to Domestic Violence: The Dade 
County Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 691 (1992) (on the Miami experi-
ment); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: 
The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992) 
(on the Milwaukee Experiment). 
 155. See ATT’Y GEN. TASK FORCE ON FAM. VIOLENCE: FINAL REP., supra note 149, at 17. 
For discussions of the U.S. Attorney General’s report, see David A. Ford & Mary Jean Re-
goli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT, supra note 116, at 127, 148-49; Hanna, supra note 147, at 
1526; Sherman, supra note 144, at 3. 
 156. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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preferred arrest.157 Today, the support for arrest remains firm despite 
the recognition that mediation between the parties continues to be 
the more likely police response.158 Rather than simply relying upon 
arrest to end domestic violence, arrest is argued to be the first criti-
cal link in a “coordinated response” of various criminal and social 
agencies which must respond collectively and aggressively against 
domestic violence.159 Emphasizing the need to send a message of 
community intolerance, arrest supporters promote the importance of 
arrest as a general deterrent to domestic violence despite its failure 
as a deterrent in specific instances.160 Objectives other than deter-
rence are also advanced. Just as the effectiveness of arrest is not con-
sidered in determining whether or not to arrest in non-domestic 
situations, pro-arrest advocates argue that the effectiveness of arrest 
is not a relevant consideration in the domestic violence context.161 Ar-
rest is favored because it marks a “get tough” attitude toward domes-
tic violence.162 Pro-arrest policies consequently take on a symbolic 
                                                                                                                    
 157. In commenting on reactions to the various studies, a principal author of the Min-
neapolis experiment found that, “[t]he Minneapolis findings stirred enormous interest by a 
wide range of writers and editorialists, who hailed the results as a breakthrough. The rep-
lication results received grudging acceptance in some of those quarters, and complete si-
lence in most others.” Sherman, supra note 144, at 44-45 (citations omitted). While advo-
cates in support of arrest have held this position despite the studies’ conflicting findings, 
this belief seems to be supported by more recent statistical analysis of all six studies which 
found that arrest was associated with lower rates of repeat violence through a variety of 
measures. See Christopher D. Maxwell et al., The Effects of Arrest on Intimate Partner Vio-
lence: New Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program, NAT’L INST. JUST.: RES. 
BRIEF, July 2001, at 1, 9.  
 For discussion of the opposition to arrest, see infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 158. A more recent national study based upon data drawn from the 1992 through 1994 
National Crime Victimization Surveys (NCVS) on personal and household victimization 
similarly concluded that police are less likely to arrest in cases of intimate assault than in 
other assault cases. While the study was limited to male-on-female violence, it also re-
ported that in cases of intimate violence the probability of arrest increased: (1) with the in-
creased age of the victims or offenders; (2) when the victim is white; (3) when the offender 
is black; (4) when the offender is under the influence of drugs or alcohol; (5) when weapons 
are involved; and (6) with the increased wealth of the victim. Edem F. Avakame & James 
J. Fyfe, Differential Police Treatment of Male-on-Female Spousal Violence: Additional Evi-
dence on the Leniency Thesis, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 22, 29-34 (2001); see also 
Hanna, supra note 147, at 1516-19 (noting that the inclination against arrest in the do-
mestic violence context appears to continue although pro-arrest policies are increasing). 
 159. Lerman, supra note 154, at 220-24; see also Bowman, supra note 116, at 202; Lisa 
A. Frisch, Research That Succeeds, Policies That Fail, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 
212-16 (1992); Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
207, 211 (1997). 
 160. Bowman, supra note 116, at 206; Frisch, supra note 159, at 209; J. David Hirschel 
& Ira W. Hutchison, Realities and Implications of the Charlotte Spousal Abuse Experiment, 
in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 147, at 54, 80; Lerman, supra 
note 154, at 225; Daniel D. Polsby, Suppressing Domestic Violence with Law Reforms, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250, 252 (1992); Zorza, supra note 147, at 72. 
 161. Frisch, supra note 159, at 213; Lerman, supra note 154, at 224. 
 162. Sherman, supra note 144, at 45. For a direct criticism of criminal efforts in the 
domestic violence context which may have only symbolic value, see Hanna, supra note 147, 
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importance, for they reject the traditional treatment of domestic vio-
lence as a private matter and openly acknowledge domestic violence 
as a public crime. In this respect, the pro-arrest position of many 
feminists can be easily understood as it is consistent with the 
broader campaign of feminists to “explode” the private/public dichot-
omy which has historically been used to relegate women’s issues to 
the private, thereby preventing any legal response.163 
 While support for arrest is strong, the inconsistent nature of the 
studies on arrest has resulted in some opposition to arrest. Not all 
domestic violence scholars unequivocally support arrest. Ironically, 
today’s most notable critics of arrest are the authors of the original 
Minneapolis Experiment. While still in favor of warrantless arrest, 
the researchers are strongly against mandatory arrest laws. Believ-
ing mandatory arrest policies only decrease violence when imple-
mented against persons without strong social connections that could 
be jeopardized by arrest, the researchers go so far as to recommend 
the repeal of mandatory arrest laws in communities with “substan-
tial ghetto poverty populations with high unemployment rates,” and 
to suggest returning to greater police discretion combined with in-
creased reliance on such non-criminal responses as shelters and 
treatment programs for victims and offenders.164 Feminists concerned 
with the limited value of arrest can also be found. Some feminists 
critique the emphasis on arrest for its failure to address the “sexual 
inequality, coercive control, and entrapment” dynamics surrounding 
                                                                                                                    
at 1525 (noting the illusory nature of “get tough” criminal efforts which are allowing of-
fenders to “get off”). 
 163. MACKINNON, supra note 100, at 100. The private/public domestic violence dichot-
omy and the effort to treat domestic violence as a public act has received terrific attention. 
See, e.g., Honorable Karen Bunstein, Naming the Violence: Destroying the Myth, 58 ALB. L. 
REV. 961, 964-65 (1995) (arguing the failure to recognize domestic violence as a public is-
sue allows for its tolerance); Hanna, supra note 106, at 1869-77, 1907 (discussing the femi-
nist public/private dichotomy and aggressive prosecution of batterers as a means of recog-
nizing domestic violence as a public crime rather than a private matter); Hanna, supra 
note 147, at 1509 (furthering arguments for aggressive action against batterers through a 
discussion of stiffer sentencing standards); Mahoney, supra note 108, at 11-13 (acknowl-
edging society’s denial of domestic violence); Schneider, supra note 116, at 1250-51 (dis-
cussing the need to reconceptualize domestic violence as a social problem in need of a pub-
lic solution); Schneider, supra note 108, at 645-48 (outlining the growing treatment of do-
mestic violence as a public harm); Seymore, supra note 116, at 1070-73 (discussing the 
spousal immunity doctrine in light of the private versus public domestic violence debate); 
Siegel, supra note 116, at 2154 (discussing the struggle against marital violence being re-
garded as a right of privacy and the “modernization” of arguments which allow for the per-
petuation of domestic violence); Laura W. Stein, Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Re-
sponse to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1153 (1993) 
(arguing in favor of a limited sphere of privacy in order to enhance autonomy and other 
values). 
 164. Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 147, at 51. For a full discussion of such class con-
cerns, see Lawrence W. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to Long-Term Escalation: 
Short-Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991). 
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domestic violence.165 In an effort to maintain domestic violence char-
acterized as a crime of patriarchy, feminist critics also oppose more 
stringent arrest policies as they believe female victims of domestic 
violence will end up the ones at greater risk of arrest.166 Other victim-
related concerns are also raised. The use of aggressive arrest policies 
are feared likely to backfire in communities where cultural and social 
norms dictate against taking any highly visible public action against 
one’s abuser, thus discouraging a victim who might otherwise call the 
police for limited counseling and assistance from calling at all.167 
Similarly, aggressive arrest policies are criticized for their risk of dis-
couraging victims from seeking police assistance when they believe 
arrest could threaten the batterer’s employment, thereby threatening 
the victim’s and family’s economic stability.168 In the most general 
sense, by ignoring the individual victim’s unique situation and feel-
ings regarding personal safety, and the effectiveness of arrest, “force-
ful” legal responses such as mandatory arrest may legitimately be 
characterized as “revictimizing” the victim.169 
                                                                                                                    
 165. Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in DO ARRESTS 
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 96, at 115, 125. 
 166. In raising such a concern, Linda Mills relied upon a Los Angeles study, which 
found that while the number of men arrested doubled, the number of women arrested 
quadrupled with the implementation of mandatory arrest. LINDA G. MILLS, THE HEART OF 
INTIMATE ABUSE: NEW INTERVENTIONS IN CHILD WELFARE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND 
HEALTH SETTINGS 50 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1998). Interestingly, the statistics were relied 
upon without any effort by Mills to determine whether the women might have been prop-
erly arrested for abusive behavior. See id. A similar study noting the increase in dual ar-
rest and the risk such arrest presents to battered women was also conducted in Connecti-
cut. See Margaret E. Martin, Double Your Trouble: Dual Arrest in Family Violence, 12 J. 
FAM. VIOLENCE 139 (1997).  
 The failure of such criticisms to take into account the possibility that the women ar-
rested for violence may not always simply be victims is consistent with this Article’s gen-
eral premise that women are implicitly believed not capable of committing domestic vio-
lence. 
 167. Kelly, supra note 108, at 311-12; Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Ref-
uge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 
680-82 (1998). 
 168. On the acknowledgment of the economic considerations that may deter a victim 
from seeking assistance, see, for example, Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 147, at 47. As 
a corollary, it is also acknowledged that victims may have a difficult time finding or main-
taining employment due to such factors as having limited child care alternatives, showing 
poor employment histories due to prolonged domestic violence, and suffering from low self-
esteem or post traumatic stress disorder. Davis & Kraham, supra note 108, at 1150-55. 
 169. For revictimization concerns brought on by a state’s unilateral decision to prose-
cute, see Bowman, supra note 116, at 203-05; Hanna, supra note 106, at 1884. For related 
discussions, see Kelly, supra note 108, at 321 (discussing revictimization in federal gov-
ernment’s decision to deport victim’s batterer); Meier, supra note 106, at 1333-34 (discuss-
ing the need for domestic violence advocates to take care to avoid “usurping [the battered 
woman’s] autonomy and decisionmaking”).  
 While the fear of increased violence may be specifically associated with arrest, it is more 
generally associated with any efforts made by the victim to leave or separate from the 
abuser. For discussion of separation assault, see supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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 In setting out this variety of opinions, the effort here is not to re-
solve the debate over the efficacy of arrest. Rather, regardless of the 
position on arrest one may ultimately adopt, the objective here is 
simply to reveal the gender biases running throughout police prac-
tices and legal standards of liability, and to argue that such biases 
must be acknowledged in any sincere effort to effectively utilize ar-
rest. 
(b)   The Gendered Promotion of Arrest 
 When it comes to arrest, female domestic violence offenders are 
simply not considered. As one of the arrest replication experiments 
candidly noted, female offenders were not included in the study be-
cause they were considered not to pose any danger.170 Their exclusion 
from the study clearly implied that arrest could be used in a more 
discretionary manner by the police when it came to female offenders 
than it could be in the case of male offenders.171 Such an assertion 
seems glaringly inconsistent with the experiment’s authors’ later 
conclusion that despite any inconclusive findings on the effectiveness 
of arrest, arrest remains a “more conscionable choice than non-
arrest” because of the desire to communicate to men, women and 
children that domestic violence is unacceptable.172 While such re-
marks and oversights might be disregarded as mere political com-
mentary, other evidence clearly demonstrates that police ignore the 
violence perpetrated by women and that such inaction is judicially 
endorsed.  
(c)   The Statistics 
 As part of the second National Family Violence Survey, research-
ers included a series of questions directed at men and women who 
had been involved in some form of intimate violence in which they 
had called the police for assistance.173 While arrest was gaining ac-
                                                                                                                    
On concerns regarding the safety of a victim’s children upon separation, see supra note 108 
and accompanying text. 
 170. Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 160, at 65. 
 171. Id. 
 172. These remarks were made in conjunction with the Charlotte replication experi-
ment which found that arrest did not deter domestic violence. Id. at 80 (quoting J.D. 
HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT REPLICATION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, 159-
69 (1991). For a discussion of the Charlotte replication study and the other arrest experi-
ments, see supra note 154 and accompanying text. For other similar support for arrest de-
spite the inconclusive nature of the arrest studies, see supra notes 155-57 and accompany-
ing text. 
 173. Of the over 6,000 individuals and over 4,000 families interviewed as part of this 
survey in 1985, approximately 800 individuals had been involved in some form of intimate 
violence. INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 170. Of that number approximately one in 
twenty households (4.8%) had called the police. Id. Of these callers, seventeen were men 
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ceptance during the time of the study (as remains true today), media-
tion efforts such as trying to calm everyone or taking time to listen to 
the story remained the “typical form of intervention used by [the] po-
lice” in the cases studied.174 Yet, in comparing the use of more force-
ful police action when women called as opposed to when men called, 
police were much more likely to respond aggressively when the caller 
was a woman. When women called, the male spouse was ordered out 
of the home 41.4% of the time.175 However, in no cases were female 
spouses ordered to leave the home when men called.176 Similarly, 
when women called, the men were threatened with arrest at the time 
of the incident in 10.7% of the cases, and threatened with arrest 
upon the next call in 28.2% of the cases.177 By contrast, women were 
never threatened with arrest when men called.178 Finally, in compar-
ing the actual use of arrest, while in 15.2% of the cases the man was 
arrested upon the woman’s call, no woman was ever arrested when a 
man called.179 In fact, it was three times more likely that a man would 
be arrested if he called as opposed to the female caller being ar-
rested.180 Not surprisingly, researchers found male callers to be gen-
erally “less pleased” with the police response than the female callers, 
who described the police intervention to be “about right.”181 
 Given that the same survey found a striking similarity in the use 
of intimate violence by men and women, such statistics cannot easily 
be explained by the suggestion that the male callers were likely to 
have suffered more minimal acts of violence.182 Indeed, given society’s 
denial of the reality of female violence and the unmanly stigma at-
tached to any man who claims to be a victim of such violence, men 
are much less likely than women to call for help, choosing instead to 
react “in private.”183 In fact, it may be more likely that the male call-
                                                                                                                    
and twenty-four were women. Id. For a discussion of the 1985 and other National Family 
Violence Surveys, see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
 174. INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 170; see also supra note 158 and accompa-
nying text (noting mediation remains the predominant response to domestic violence). 
 175.  INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 262. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. As opposed to 4.2% of the women callers being arrested, 12.1% of the male callers 
were arrested. Id. 
 181. Id. at 170-71. For a recent study of female victims of intimate violence and the fac-
tors which affect their satisfaction with various components of the legal system when their 
batterers have been arrested, see Fleury, supra note 116, at 191. 
 182. For a comparison of the use of violence by men and women as uncovered by the 
second National Survey of Family Violence and other studies, see supra notes 173-80 and 
accompanying text. 
 183. In the 1985 National Survey of Family Violence, researchers found the most typi-
cal male reaction to being hit was to yell, followed by running out of the room. INTIMATE 
VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 150. Less than fifteen in one hundred men said they reacted 
by striking back. Id. Female victims’ most common reaction was to cry, followed by yelling. 
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ers surveyed were victims of greater violence than the female callers 
as only severe violence would be threatening enough for a man to 
call. Taking such considerations into account, what such statistics do 
seem to reflect is that police share the accepted view about female 
violence: it does not exist. 
(d)   Thurman v. City of Torrington 
 In addition to the police, the feminist understanding of domestic 
violence is also adhered to and reinforced by the courts. Based upon 
Equal Protection claims, arguments for police liability have success-
fully been made when the police fail to adequately respond in the 
case of intimate violence.184 However, a review of the court decisions 
in this area suggests that the standard of liability extends only to 
cases involving female victims of intimate violence. The critical 1984 
decision in Thurman v. City of Torrington185 set the tone, adding the 
judicial branch to the increasingly pervasive number of institutions 
that ignore female violence. 
 The facts of Tracey Thurman’s case against the City of Torrington 
and its police department are equally horrific and sympathetic. For 
nearly nine months, Tracey was “attacked” and “threatened” by her 
estranged husband, Charles, on numerous occasions. Tracey repeat-
edly requested the assistance of the city police, asking them to arrest 
her husband.186 In turn, the police repeatedly refused to take any ac-
tion. Finally, the escalating violence culminated in Charles stabbing 
Tracey and then, in the presence of the police, dropping the knife, 
kicking Tracey once in the head, running indoors and seizing their 
child, dropping the child on his wounded mother and then kicking 
Tracey in the head once again. Despite several police officers wit-
nessing such brutal events, Charles was arrested only after Tracey 
was placed on a stretcher and Charles, remaining on the scene and 
continuing to threaten Tracey, approached Tracey once again as she 
lay on the stretcher.187  
                                                                                                                    
Id. at 147-48. Approximately one in four women responded by striking back. Id. For fur-
ther discussion of male reaction to female violence and society’s denial of such violence, see 
Steinmetz, supra note 6, at 503-04; see also supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text and 
infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text. 
 184. See infra Part IV.B.2(a).  
 185. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). 
 186. After her car windshield was smashed by her husband in the presence of a police 
officer (who had stood by watching Charles scream threats at Tracey prior to smashing the 
window), Charles had been arrested, convicted of breaching the peace, and placed on pro-
bation. Charles’s ongoing menacing contact constituted both a violation of his probation 
and perhaps a violation of the restraining order obtained by Tracey, thereby providing suf-
ficient basis to re-arrest Charles. Id. at 1524-26. 
 187. Id. 
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 In her § 1983 action, Tracey successfully argued in response to the 
city’s motion for summary judgment that the police department’s in-
action violated her Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal pro-
tection.188 
 As noted earlier, the Thurman decision is routinely cited as a key 
catalyst in the national adoption of mandatory arrest policies.189 For 
more practical individuals who believe that the purpose of police de-
partment policy changes are not to increase public safety but rather 
to avoid department liability, Thurman is cited as the only motiva-
tor.190 With this degree of significance, Thurman’s gender implica-
tions must be candidly acknowledged.  
 In evaluating the Equal Protection claim, Thurman described the 
analysis as a comparison of police treatment of “a woman abused or 
assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend” with police treatment of “all 
other persons whose personal safety is threatened, including women 
not involved in domestic relationships.”191 Given this gendered nu-
ance, Thurman was afforded intermediate scrutiny.192 Thurman then 
held in favor of the plaintiff as the government failed to meet its bur-
den of citing “an important governmental interest” which would jus-
                                                                                                                    
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the ju-
risdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
 In addition to her § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment challenge, Tracey’s action also 
raised other constitutional claims pursuant to the Fifth and Ninth Amendments and re-
lated statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and 1988. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 
1524. At trial, Tracey Thurman was awarded $2.3 million in damages, however this jury 
award was later reduced to $1.9 million through a settlement exchange in which the gov-
ernment agreed to forgo any appeal. Carolyne R. Hathaway, Comment, Gender Based Dis-
crimination in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J. 
667, 668 n.14 (1986). 
 189. See supra notes 150, 185 and accompanying text (noting the role of the 1984 
Thurman decision). 
 190. Frisch, supra note 159, at 212. Lawrence Sherman, the author of the Minneapolis 
experiment, has also suggested that the increase in the use of arrest in domestic violence 
cases is more likely a result of the Thurman decision than his study’s suggestion that ar-
rest has a deterrent effect. Sherman, supra note 144, at 23. In fact, in one study of urban 
and rural police agencies, the Minneapolis experiment ranked lowest in a list of eight fac-
tors accounting for police changes in arrest policies. Id. at 24. For a history of other influ-
ential court challenges brought by battered women and their advocates prior to Thurman, 
see Zorza, supra note 147, at 53-60. 
 191. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527. 
 192. Id. at 1527-28 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 
U.S. 1124 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). As succinctly summarized by the 
court, “[c]lassifications on the basis of gender will be held invalid under the equal protec-
tion clause unless they are substantially related to an important governmental objective.” 
Id. at 1526 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 197). 
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tify “its disparate treatment of women.”193 Recognizing that wife 
beating was historically a male prerogative, the court denounced 
such a practice, finding that it must “join other ‘archaic and over-
broad’ premises” which had been traditionally used to condone other 
acts of gender discrimination.194 
 While not disputing the importance of a non-discriminatory police 
response to victims of violence, the Equal Protection framework util-
ized to advance a fair treatment policy must be critically examined. 
Why did the court compare the treatment of female victims of inti-
mate violence by male partners versus “all others”? Why did the 
court not simply compare the treatment of victims of intimate vio-
lence versus the victims of stranger violence, regardless of gender? 
Relegated to a footnote, the court responded to such questions. It 
would accept plaintiff’s allegation of gender-discrimination as true.195 
In so doing, the court cited to only one study which reviewed the 
cases of criminal defendants charged with intimate violence and 
found that men were the defendants in twenty-nine out of every 
thirty cases.196 Given the nonrepresentative nature of criminal stud-
ies which fail to measure the full scope of victims and the general 
concern regarding prosecutorial studies, the soundness of the court’s 
decision must be challenged.197 Yet what is more troubling is the 
deeper implications of the court’s findings. By adopting a gender-
related standard, the court was able to employ an intermediate scru-
tiny analysis, thus making the government’s justification for its ar-
rest policy more difficult. However, in finding that the government 
had “failed to put forward any justification” for its arrest policy, it is 
likely that the government would have failed even if Thurman had 
adopted a genderless standard, and thereby, compared the police 
treatment of intimate versus stranger violence at the rational basis 
level of review.198 Arguably then, if the court’s interest was ensuring 
                                                                                                                    
 193. Id. at 1527-28. 
 194. Id. at 1528 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99). The court also included other rec-
ognized examples as gender discrimination. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (de-
nying the traditional belief that a woman’s place is in the home); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (rejecting the misconception that female wages do not 
contribute to family support); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (dismiss-
ing the belief that husbands of female servicewomen are not dependent on their spouses as 
compared to wives of male servicemen); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 
1976) (preventing the denial of a pregnant woman’s ability to serve in the military). 
 195. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528 n.1. 
 196. Id. (citing STEPHEN LEEDS, FAMILY OFFENSE CASES IN THE FAMILY COURT SYS-
TEM: A STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION ii (1978)). 
 197. For a critical discussion of the criminal studies on domestic violence and their use 
in disputing the family violence studies, see supra Part I.A.1.  
 198. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528. As acknowledged by Thurman, at this lowest 
level of scrutiny, classifications must be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.” Id. at 1526 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55, 
reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973)). 
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police action in domestic violence cases, it could have achieved this 
goal without relying on a gender-based analysis. Instead, by so read-
ily relying upon the assertion that only women are victims of domes-
tic violence, the court revealed its own “‘archaic and overbroad’ prem-
ises.”199 While the court was quick to reject stereotypes negatively ef-
fecting women, it was not ready to do the same for men. By failing to 
leave room for the possibility of female violence and that police may 
also fail to arrest in such cases, Thurman set a standard of liability 
only in the instance of the police’s failure to arrest male perpetrators. 
 Following Thurman, the intermediate scrutiny standard for 
claims made by female domestic violence victims against the police 
has broadened. Police policies or customs which are facially neutral 
may be subject to intermediate scrutiny if such policies are applied in 
a discriminatory fashion which adversely affects battered women.200 
Consequently, in many jurisdictions, proving a police policy or cus-
tom providing less protection to victims of domestic violence than 
nondomestic violence attacks is apparently not sufficient to win an 
equal protection claim. The plaintiff further has to demonstrate “that 
discrimination against women was a motivating factor,” and that the 
plaintiff was indeed injured by such practice.201 
                                                                                                                    
 199. Id. at 1528 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99). 
 200. Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
 201. Id. at 1031-33 (emphasis added) (vacating the denial of defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment but remanding action for further proceedings in light of that stan-
dard). Interestingly, Hynson’s three part test was based upon Watson v. City of Kansas 
City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988). Watson set out two possible equal protection grounds 
for battered women raising § 1983 claims. Id. at 696. While the first considers domestic 
violence victims without regard to gender, the second considers gender. Id. Applying these 
standards, Watson reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant city regarding 
plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory treatment against victims of domestic violence as com-
pared to victims of nondomestic attacks. The court reasoned that a jury could infer dis-
criminatory motive, but found insufficient evidence to reverse summary judgment in favor 
of the city as to the plaintiff’s claim of class-based discrimination based on sex. Id. at 694-
97.  
 Other cases have adopted a gender-based, intermediate scrutiny analysis. See generally 
Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001) (adopting Watson standard to review gen-
der-based equal protection claims against law enforcement in domestic violence cases); 
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding with in-
structions to allow plaintiff to amend her equal protection claim of gender and marital 
status discrimination against police in responding to domestic violence calls by battered 
women because of certain evidence sufficient to suggest “an animus against abused 
women”); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1989) (adopting gender-
based discrimination standard but dismissing claimant’s § 1983 claims as a “complete fail-
ure” of proof to support allegation of discrimination against victims of domestic violence 
and finding it therefore unnecessary to reach allegation of police following policy of inten-
tional discrimination against women).  
 For further discussion of the equal protection and due process standards relied upon in 
the review of § 1983 claims by battered women, see generally Hathaway, supra note 188, 
at 667-77 (for a discussion of Thurman, 595 F. Supp. 1521); Laura S. Harper, Note, Bat-
tered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After Deshaney v. 
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 As a practical matter, such a standard communicates that police 
liability can only result in cases of nonintervention on behalf of fe-
male victims. By tailoring the standard exclusively to battered 
women, the courts have further reinforced the belief that only women 
can be the victims of domestic violence. The effect of Thurman and 
its progeny has been to train police to respond aggressively in the 
case of male aggressors while further discounting the complaints of 
female violence. Thurman, then, should not be acknowledged as re-
sponsible for the national adoption of mandatory arrest policies in 
domestic violence cases. Thurman should be credited for the devel-
opment of mandatory arrest policies only in the case of male perpe-
trators and female victims. 
2.   Prosecution 
(a)   The Development of Prosecution Policies and Theories 
 Recognizing that a “coordinated response” is the only means by 
which a definitive effort to end domestic violence can truly be made, 
prosecution is regarded as the critical next step following arrest.202 
Echoing the justifications for pro-arrest policies, aggressive prosecu-
tion is favored as part of an overarching effort to criminalize domes-
tic violence and make it a public crime.203 The strength of this ambi-
tion is well illustrated through the recent enactment of the Violence 
                                                                                                                    
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990) (ana-
lyzing the equal protection and due process claims of battered women under § 1983 after 
the Supreme Court held that there was no general constitutional right to police protection 
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 191 
(1989)); Kalyani Robbins, Note, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good Pol-
icy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205, 223-30 (1999). 
 For the recognition that heightened scrutiny is “not necessary” and that a rational basis 
test can be successfully utilized when evaluating police failure-to-protect claims made by 
victims of domestic violence as compared to victims of other crimes of violence, see id. at 
227-28 (citing to the successful use of a rational basis review by victims of domestic vio-
lence in Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986)); Lauren L. 
McFarlane, Note, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When the Police 
Will Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 950-51 (1991) (citing City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (supporting the argument that “nega-
tive attitudes” about victims of domestic violence should be sufficient to find police failure 
to protect victims of domestic violence based upon a nondeferential rational basis stan-
dard)). 
 202. For the promotion of a “coordinated response” to domestic violence between vari-
ous legal and social agencies, see supra note 159 and accompanying text. For a comparison 
of arrest and prosecution efforts, see, for example, BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 
54 (recognizing that problems associated with addressing domestic violence in the arrest 
context are repeated and become even more severe in the judicial context); Naomi R. Cahn 
& Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES, 
supra note 116, at 95, 96 (lamenting that the increase in preferred arrest policies is not 
matched by increased prosecution); Ford & Regoli, supra note 155, at 129 (advocating the 
maintenance of advances in prosecution on par with increased arrest efforts). 
 203. For a discussion of the support of pro-arrest policies, see supra notes 160-62 and 
accompanying text. 
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Against Women Act (VAWA).204 The Act aggressively attempts to: 
mandate the arrest and prosecution of domestic violence offenders; 
devote greater resources to domestic violence training for law en-
forcement; make certain domestic violence offenses federal crimes; 
and provide various civil remedies for victims.205 However, as with 
arrest, support for strong prosecution policies is neither universal 
nor longstanding. VAWA provisions, such as those providing certain 
federal civil remedies for intrastate acts of domestic violence, have 
been struck down as unconstitutional.206 Such resistance is also visi-
ble at the state level, where state prosecution of domestic violence of-
fenders, although increasing, is increasing at a very gradual rate.207 
Like arrest, this slow development of aggressive prosecution policies 
illustrates conflicting feminist goals.208 And again, as with arrest, any 
consensus which can be found in support of prosecution reveals only 
an interest in prosecuting male offenders.209 
 A long list of reasons can be given for the traditional reluctance to 
prosecute domestic violence.210 Included among the most objective 
reasons is that criminal dockets are already overwhelmed by non-
domestic cases and cannot absorb the flood of cases which would be 
introduced by criminalizing all forms of violence between inti-
mates.211 Decisions then must be made as to which domestic violence 
cases, if any, should be prosecuted. This may result in prosecutors 
                                                                                                                    
 204. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 205. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1516 (summarizing the practical and theoretical goals 
of VAWA); see also Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims: 
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 557, 575 (2000); Charis Mincavage, Comment, Title III of the Violence 
Against Women Act: Can It Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge in the Wake of United 
States v. Lopez?, 102 DICK. L. REV. 441 (1998). 
 206. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Comment, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
135 (2000). 
 207. In 1996, a survey of prosecutorial developments in medium and large jurisdictions 
determined there was a “growing commitment” to “vigorous prosecution.” Donald J. Rebo-
vich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large Jurisdictions, 
in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 96, at 176, 188. For further 
discussion of prosecutorial developments, see infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
 208. For discussion of the conflicts in arrest theory, see supra notes 164-69 and accom-
panying text. 
 209. In this respect, while the provisions of VAWA are gender-neutral, its title simi-
larly reflects a singular interest at the federal level in addressing only violence against 
women. For a discussion of VAWA, see supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. 
 210. For lengthy discussions of the variety of such reasons and their connection, see, 
for example, BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 56-62; FAGAN, supra note 154, at 27-
29; Cahn & Lerman, supra note 202, at 96; Ford & Regoli, supra note 155, at 132-43; 
Hanna, supra note 106, at 1860-63; Hanna, supra note 147, at 1551-54; Hirschel & Hutchi-
son, supra note 147; Rebovich, supra note 207, at 176-77. 
 211. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 56-58; FAGAN, supra note 154, at 27-28; 
Hanna, supra note 147, at 1553-54. 
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strategically deciding only to pursue cases based on legitimate con-
siderations of whether or not they will be successful given the extent 
of injury and available evidence.212 Yet prosecutors, judges, and other 
court personnel are also recognized to harbor the same social biases 
that prevent treating domestic violence as anything other than a mi-
nor, private matter in which the victim is as much to blame as the 
abuser.213 Such attitudes prevent vigorous prosecution. A victim’s 
own reluctance to prosecute may also be a product of such biases.214 
Victims may be further dissuaded by fear of the batterer’s retalia-
tion, ongoing love of the batterer, economic considerations, and other 
complicated feelings including what may be best for any children in-
volved.215 
 Despite these challenges, the strong push to criminalize domestic 
violence has resulted in a variety of policies and programs intended 
to increase prosecution.216 Among the most prominent are such inno-
vations as no-drop policies limiting prosecutorial discretion,217 victim 
support services within both police and prosecutors’ offices,218 and 
specialized domestic violence prosecution units and courts.219 Yet 
even with such developments, prosecution is still recognized as a 
“relatively rare event.”220 
                                                                                                                    
 212. Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 147, at 54-55. 
 213. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 56-58, 60-62; FAGAN, supra note 154, at 
27-28; Cahn & Lerman, supra note 202, at 96; Ford & Regoli, supra note 155, at 136; 
Hanna, supra note 106, at 1860-63; Rebovich, supra note 207, at 176-77; Robbins, supra 
note 201, at 211. 
 214. Kelly, supra note 108, at 310-11. Such biases may be magnified for victims of cer-
tain cultures in which public acknowledgment of abuse is seen as violating strict codes on 
family privacy and honor. Kelly, supra note 167, at 680-82. 
 215. On the variety of victim concerns and their impact on the rate of prosecution, see 
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 58-60; Hanna, supra note 147, at 1551 n.191; 
Hirschel & Hutchison,  supra note 147, at 47; Kelly, supra note 108, at 308-10; and Kelly, 
supra note 167, at 675-82. 
 216. For a general overview of such prosecutorial developments, see, for example, 
FAGAN, supra note 154, at 6-10; Cahn & Lerman, supra note 202, at 96-109; and Rebovich, 
supra note 207, at 180-90. 
 217. For several articles written exclusively on the variety of such policies and their 
strengths and weaknesses, see, for example, Hanna, supra note 106; Robbins, supra note 
201. 
 218. Cahn & Lerman, supra note 202, at 98-100; Rebovich, supra note 207, at 187-88. 
 219.  FAGAN, supra note 154, at 15; HARVEY WALLACE, FAMILY VIOLENCE: LEGAL, 
MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 226-32 (2d ed. 1999); Cahn & Lerman, supra note 
202, at 98-107; Rebovich, supra note 207, at 181.  
 220. Fleury, supra note 116, at 183. Relying on the statistics gathered during the Min-
neapolis experiment and subsequent replication studies, it was found that of the 136 sus-
pects arrested in the Minneapolis study, only three were subsequently fined or incarcer-
ated. Only 5% ever even had charges filed against them. In the Charlotte study, 35% of the 
suspects who were charged were prosecuted. In the Omaha study, 64% of those arrested 
were sentenced through fines, probation, jail, or some combination. Ford & Regoli, supra 
note 155, at 129-30. For more on the arrest experiments, see supra Part IV.B.1.  
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(b)   The Gendered Promotion of Prosecution 
 Given that such formal administrative and policy changes have 
not yielded terrific change, domestic violence prosecution debates 
now center around what is commonly recognized as the greatest 
stumbling block to prosecution—victim reluctance.221 Some academ-
ics advocate even more aggressive use of no-drop policies which 
would take the controversial step of forcing victim participation when 
necessary.222 Grounded in theory and practice, such a position is ar-
gued as best suited for ensuring victim safety and effective prosecu-
tion as well as sending the critical message that domestic violence is 
not tolerated.223 Other advocates staunchly defend a victim’s right to 
choose. Yet in so doing, they also claim reliance upon theoretical and 
empirical studies to argue that prosecution only effectively deters 
domestic violence when a victim retains the right to drop the 
charges.224 
                                                                                                                    
 221. See, e.g., BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 58-60 (citing domestic violence 
victim attrition rates at 60% to 80% while recognizing that prosecutors often further dis-
courage victims to prosecute); Ford & Regoli, supra note 155, at 141-43 (blaming the vic-
tim’s desire to drop charges on outside forces); Hanna, supra note 147, at 1551 n.191 (cit-
ing victim reluctance to go forward as responsible for lack of prosecution of domestic vio-
lence crimes). 
 222. Taking this step only at the most extreme instance, Professor Hanna also argues 
strongly in favor of improved efforts to gather and use various forms of nontestimonial evi-
dence that can be obtained from such physical evidence as police investigations, 911 calls, 
and medical records. Hanna, supra note 106, at 1898-1919. 
 223. In addition to her own personal experience as a prosecutor of domestic violence 
cases, Professor Hanna points to a study in San Diego which credited the reduction in do-
mestic violence related homicides to the adoption of a no-drop policy. Id. at 1853, 1864 
n.64, 1867 (arguing in favor of “hard” no-drop policies and relying on Mark Hansen, New 
Strategy in Battering Cases: About a Third of Jurisdictions Prosecute without Victim’s Tes-
timony, 81 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14); see also Robbins, supra note 201, at 216-17 n.77 (re-
lying on same San Diego homicide study). In a later work, Professor Hanna further de-
fends her position in favor of aggressive prosecution. In summary, she argues that giving 
decision-making power to the prosecutor rather than to the victim is the best means to 
prevent intimidation and reinforce the notion of domestic violence as a public crime, not a 
private matter. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1506 n.2. 
 224. The only randomized field experiment to evaluate the deterrence of domestic vio-
lence as a result of various prosecution policies was conducted in reliance upon 678 cases of 
wife battery in Marion County (primarily Indianapolis), Indiana. With the assistance of 
the prosecutor’s office, the cases were randomly assigned by the prosecutor to four “prose-
cution tracks” (no prosecution, pretrial diversion, prosecution with rehabilitation, or prose-
cution with more severe sanctions). These cases included both instances in which the vic-
tim was allowed to drop the charges and those in which she was prevented from doing so. 
The study concluded that regardless of the prosecution track initiated by the prosecutor’s 
office, rates of recidivism only decreased significantly in the cases in which the victim had 
the choice to proceed and chose to proceed. The study also cautioned that victims who had 
chosen to proceed but who ultimately dropped the charges were at increased risk of vio-
lence. Ford & Regoli, supra note 155, at 150-53; David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The 
Preventive Impacts of Policies for Prosecuting Wife Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 181, 192-205.  
 For recognition of the Indianapolis experiment and support of providing domestic vio-
lence victims with varying degrees of control in criminal proceedings, see, for example, 
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 Such a review of the current developments in domestic violence 
prosecution indicates that the core controversy remains very much 
tied to a core tension in feminist theory—a desire to make domestic 
violence a public crime on the one hand and efforts to preserve fe-
male autonomy on the other.225 What is missing from the debate is 
any conversation regarding the prosecution of female violence. With 
the existing discourse rooted in feminist theory, it is virtually impos-
sible for such a subject to be introduced, much less entertained. Re-
gardless of their conflicting conclusions, the few recognized empirical 
studies which do exist on the issue of effectiveness of prosecution are 
limited to the study of male batterers.226 In all discussions of prosecu-
tion, it is either assumed, implied, or outright stated that the sole ob-
jective is to help battered women.227 Such comments are made even 
by scholars who criticize the minimal research and stagnant debates 
on prosecution and call for more global and radical efforts in order to 
end domestic violence.228 Again, the efforts to end domestic violence 
                                                                                                                    
MILLS, supra note 166, at 56-57 (viewing the Indianapolis study, in comparison with later 
studies on the effectiveness of mandatory prosecution, to be equivocal, but ultimately sug-
gesting that decision control be left with the victim); VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES: ASSESSING 
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS 180-81 (Rosemary Chalk & Patricia A. King eds., 
1998) (acknowledging the Indianapolis study but questioning the effectiveness of prosecu-
tion given the limited nature of the studies thus completed); Fleury, supra note 116, at 184 
(arguing that victims must have a “sense” of control, even if they have no “actual” control); 
Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 147, at 48 (acknowledging the importance of the Indian-
apolis study). 
 225. In her discussion of prosecution efforts, Professor Hanna acknowledges this ten-
sion through critical examination of the public/private dichotomy. She further considers 
the tensions engendered by feminist theory on themes of particularity/generality and 
agency/victimization. Hanna, supra note 106, at 1869-85. 
 226. While there are generally recognized to be just two principal studies on the effec-
tiveness of prosecution, only the Indianapolis experiment attempts to determine if prosecu-
tion reduces the recidivism rates of violent men. On the Indianapolis experiment, see Ford 
& Regoli, supra note 155, and Ford & Regoli, supra note 224. The other principal prosecu-
tion study examines what variables influence prosecutorial discretion in the decision to 
prosecute abusive men. Janell Schmidt & Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Filing Charges in Domestic Violence Cases, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 487 (1989). A more re-
cent study similarly devoted itself only to how satisfied female victims of domestic violence 
are with the legal system’s handling of their cases and what factors impact their satisfac-
tion levels. Fleury, supra note 116; see also supra note 224 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing studies on the prosecution of domestic violence). As noted earlier, the six principal 
studies on the effectiveness of arrest were limited to the arrest of male batterers. See supra 
notes 151-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Minneapolis Experiment and the five 
replication studies). 
 227. The titles of various works on prosecution alone are revealing on this point. See, 
e.g., Cahn & Lerman, supra note 202; Fleury, supra note 116; Ford & Regoli, supra note 
155; Ford & Regoli, supra note 224. 
 228. See, e.g., FAGAN, supra note 154, at 48 (critiquing the limited existing means and 
proposing a variety of new means to study the criminalization of domestic violence, but 
concluding that the objective is to help battered women); Hanna, supra note 106, at 1909 
(taking the controversial position of restricting victim control in domestic violence prosecu-
tion in order to advance efforts to make domestic violence a public crime, but limiting her 
discussion to the criminalization of male violence). 
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against women are commendable and much needed. However, if we 
are truly committed to ending domestic violence, the violence by 
women needs to be both acknowledged and addressed. Reacting to 
such violence must be part of the “coordinated response.” Unfortu-
nately, however, the momentum behind the feminist hold on domes-
tic violence is not contained. Beyond restricting the development of 
arrest and prosecution policies, feminist theory has debilitated the 
treatment of both domestic violence batterers and victims.  
3.   Punishment 
(a)   Treatment 
 In any criminal context, the potential influence of the judiciary 
over domestic violence cannot be overstated. As leading domestic vio-
lence commentators well understand: 
The effect of judicial attitudes cascades throughout the criminal 
justice system. The judiciary retains the potential of leading the 
criminal justice system by example or direction. After all, they are 
the ultimate authority having the power to ratify or condemn the 
actions of the police and prosecutors, as well as defining the pa-
rameters and seriousness of a particular crime.229 
 Notwithstanding the strength of the judicial position, the judici-
ary exercises little practical influence over domestic violence today. 
The limited possibility of arrest, compounded by the unlikelihood of 
prosecution, ensures that the powerful judicial link in the “coordi-
nated response” to domestic violence will rarely be reached.230 How-
ever, in the event that police do arrest a batterer and prosecution by 
the state attorney is pursued, what action is taken by the judicial 
branch? And further, what, if any, distinctions are made between the 
response to male and female batterers who reach this stage? 
 Punishment may serve a variety of purposes—among the most 
prominent being rehabilitation, deterrence (either general or spe-
cific), incapacitation, retribution, and condemnation.231 Yet in the 
domestic violence context, rehabilitation or treatment is almost uni-
versally accepted as the sole objective.232 Interestingly, the wide-
                                                                                                                    
 229. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 65. 
 230. For a discussion of the limited use of arrest in the domestic violence context, see 
supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. On the unlikelihood of prosecution, see supra 
notes 210-15 and accompanying text. 
 231. For a general discussion of the theories of punishment underlying crimes of do-
mestic violence, see Hanna, supra note 147, at 1538-48. 
 232. VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, supra note 224, at 178; Ford & Regoli, supra note 155, at 
158; Gregory & Erez, supra note 116, at 206; Hanna, supra note 147, at 1508, 1522; Ellen 
Pence & Melanie Shepard, Integrating Feminist Theory and Practice: The Challenge of the 
Battered Women’s Movement, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 55, at 
282, 284. 
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spread state and federal “faith in treatment” traces back to the same 
1984 U.S. Attorney General’s report which also supported aggressive 
arrest polices.233 Recently, this inconsistency between promoting 
treatment while endorsing more aggressive arrest and prosecution 
policies has come under some attack. Suggesting incapacitation, not 
rehabilitation, to be the appropriate goal of punishment, at least one 
domestic violence activist and scholar advocates the more aggressive 
use of incarceration.234 
 Despite the widespread use of treatment as a criminal response to 
domestic violence, the critics of treatment are not just the small mi-
nority who favor alternative punishments. In addition to those in 
theoretical opposition to treatment, there is widespread recognition 
that treatment has, at best, yet to be proven an effective response to 
domestic violence, and at worst might encourage greater violence.235 
So why then is treatment the predictable outcome for most domestic 
violence assault cases which actually reach the courts?  
 As with prosecution, there is the practical reality that the crimi-
nal justice system is ill-equipped to underwrite more expensive and 
                                                                                                                    
 233. Per such report, incarceration was to be reserved for only the most serious injury-
producing cases of domestic violence. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1526 (discussing the 1984 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: 1984 FINAL REPORT (1984)). For 
earlier discussions of the Attorney General’s support of aggressive arrest, see supra notes 
149, 155 and accompanying text. 
 234. In advocating greater use of incarceration, Professor Hanna also notes the ineffec-
tiveness of treatment. Her support of incarceration is in keeping with her promotion of 
even more aggressive arrest and prosecution policies. Hanna, supra note 147. 
 235. For reports on a variety of treatment studies which fail to conclusively prove that 
treatment reduces domestic violence, see, for example, Edward W. Gondolf & Alison Snow 
Jones, The Program Effect of Batterer Programs in Three Cities, 16 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 
693 (2001).  The author studied the recidivism rates of domestic violence offenders enrolled 
in Denver, Houston, and Dallas treatment programs and suggested only tentatively that 
there may be a “moderate program effect.” Id. at 700; see also FAGAN, supra note 154, at 19 
(finding “very little non experimental or quasi-experimental evidence” to properly evaluate 
batterer programs); JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 116, at 231 (recognizing research 
on treatment programs yet to evidence treatment is effective); PENCE & PAYMAR, supra 
note 101, at 174-77 (surveying shelter workers in seventy-six battered women’s shelters to 
gain their perspectives on batterer’s programs and reporting results ranging from the be-
lief that such programs helped victims, to the assertion that victims were put at risk of 
greater violence, to the feeling that there was no change in the violence, or that batterers 
used such programs to gain leverage in child custody and other matters); VIOLENCE IN 
FAMILIES, supra note 224, at 180 (suggesting that rehabilitation programs must be studied 
more carefully before any conclusions regarding their effectiveness can be reached); Greg-
ory & Erez, supra note 116 (conducting interviews with thirty-three women whose batter-
ers were enrolled in treatment programs and concluding that while victims believe that 
treatment works, such feelings are often mixed with apprehension, fear and guilt); L. 
Kevin Hamberger & James E. Hastings, Court-Mandated Treatment of Men Who Assault 
Their Partner: Issues, Controversies, and Outcomes, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE 
ASSAULT, supra note 116, at 188, 207-20 (summarizing twenty-eight of the major treat-
ment studies and concluding that the mixed makeup, methodology, and results of such 
studies yields “[n]ot much” further knowledge about the effectiveness of treatment); 
Hanna, supra note 147, at 1514-38 (reviewing a variety of empirical evidence showing 
treatment is not effective); Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 291-92. 
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time-consuming forms of punishment such as incarceration.236 Judi-
cial biases against regarding domestic violence as a “real crime” also 
factor into the explanation.237 Such attitudes are exacerbated by 
treatment advocates who support treatment not because it is effec-
tive, but because it allows domestic violence activists to retain con-
trol over the issue of domestic violence, generally, and the fate of do-
mestic violence batterers, more specifically.238 At the same time, le-
gitimate concern for victim safety and awareness of the ongoing rela-
tionships between batterers and victims also exists. Such attitudes 
may give way to sincere beliefs that trying to change the behavior of 
batterers may be the best solution, even if it has yet to be proven 
possible.239 
 With this array of justifications and concerns, treatment programs 
run a certain gamut. Courts may mandate treatment as a pretrial 
diversion tactic, they may defer prosecution with the promise of a re-
duced sentence upon completion of treatment, or they may order 
treatment as part of a sentence upon conviction.240 Basic differences 
in such matters as length and size of treatment programs and 
whether such programs are group or individually oriented also ex-
ist.241 Notwithstanding the procedural and structural variety, there is 
                                                                                                                    
 236. In supporting greater use of incarceration in the domestic violence context, even 
Professor Hanna notes the practical difficulties in that cases of assault and battery be-
tween intimates may already be treated more seriously than similar cases between strang-
ers. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1524-26. For further discussion of court reluctance to im-
pose harsher sentences, see FAGAN, supra note 154, at 30-33; PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 
101, at xiii; Hanna, supra note 147, at 1556. 
 237. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 142, at 65; see also Hanna, supra note 147, at 
1556; Robbins, supra note 201, at 211-13. For further discussion of the traditional social 
minimization of domestic violence, see supra Part III.A.1.  
 238. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1550. 
 239.  JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 116, at 231; Hamberger & Hastings, supra 
note 235, at 189-90. As Cheryl Hanna concludes:  
Court-mandated treatment programs allow everyone to save face. The prosecu-
tor checks-off ‘conviction’ on his stat sheet; the defense attorney feels like she 
did some good for her client; the victim has a sense of hope, however false, that 
the criminal justice system will help her partner change his ways; the offender 
avoids jail; the judge is not accused of taking these cases too lightly; the treat-
ment program gets yet another client to support its existence; and we all go 
home happy . . . until the next time. 
Hanna, supra note 147, at 1556. 
 240.  VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, supra note 224, at 178; Hamberger & Hastings, supra 
note 235, at 190-91; Hanna, supra note 147, at 1522. 
 241. While treatment programs generally favor group counseling as opposed to a one-
on-one counseling approach, there tends to be a great deal of variation in other format 
matters. For a sampling of various program structures, see DUTTON, supra note 96 (ex-
plaining a treatment program run by the author). See also PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 
101, at 17-27 (explaining the structural design of the Duluth Model); Gondolf & Snow 
Jones, supra note 235 (reviewing the programs of Dallas, Denver, and Houston); Hamber-
ger & Hastings, supra note 235, at 203-05 (reviewing treatment format issues), 208-10 
(summarizing in chart form the variables of twenty-eight programs); Hanna, supra note 
147, at 1528-30 (reviewing the development of treatment programs). 
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currently a great deal of consistency in the philosophical approach to 
treatment. Succinctly characterized, today’s treatment programs are 
“feminist-inspired.”242 
(b)   The Feminizing of Treatment 
 Profeminist treatment has not always been the mainstay. Rather, 
its predominance is a natural development in the feminist metamor-
phosis of domestic violence. When domestic violence theory adhered 
to a belief that both the batterer and victim had some accountability, 
treatment programs relied on models which counseled the couple. As 
a result, these programs focused on the shared desire to control and 
the common repressed anger, anxiety, or other negative feelings of 
the parties which ultimately resulted in violent behavior.243 Yet as 
victim-blaming came under attack and as the cycle of violence and its 
emphasis on the male use of physical violence gained popularity, 
couple therapy was replaced by anger-management programs which 
not only allowed solely male attendance, but also demanded that 
men take full accountability for their violent behavior.244 However, 
like the original cycle of violence, this behavioral approach came un-
der criticism for teaching anger-management skills without any ef-
fort to address the underlying, but believed omnipresent, gender-
based motivation for violent male behavior toward women.245 As the 
feminist theory of connection between violence and patriarchy took 
                                                                                                                    
 242. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1530. For other recognition of the predominance of the 
feminist model, see, for example, JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 116, at 231; PHYSICAL 
VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 11-14; WEXLER, supra note 116, at 13; Hamberger & Hast-
ings, supra note 235, at 202-03; Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 294; Daniel G. Saun-
ders, Feminist, Cognitive, and Behavioral Group Interventions For Men Who Batter: An 
Overview of Rationale and Methods, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2000: AN INTEGRATED SKILLS 
PROGRAM FOR MEN: GROUP LEADER’S MANUAL, supra note 116, at 21, 22-23. 
 243. David Adams describes programs of this nature as following an “insight model” 
(explaining violent behavior as the symptom of some other underlying conflict); “ventila-
tion model” (addressing the parties’ repressed feelings and teaching “fair fighting” tactics); 
and “interaction model” (describing violence as a culmination of efforts by both parties to 
gain power and control). David Adams, Treatment Models of Men Who Batter: A Profem-
inist Analysis, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 55, at 176, 178-88; 
see also Hamberger & Hastings, supra note 235, at 196-98 (reviewing the insight, ventila-
tion, and interaction models).  
 For a discussion of early domestic violence theory and its tendency to blame both couple 
members, see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
 244. Such a model has been described as the “cognitive-behavioral” or “psychoeduca-
tional” model. Adams, supra note 243, at 188-91; see also Hamberger & Hastings, supra 
note 235, at 200-01. For a similar recognition of the move away from couples therapy, see 
Hanna, supra note 147, at 1527-28. For further discussion of the cycle of violence, see su-
pra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. For further discussion of victim-blaming, see su-
pra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 245. For a review of such criticisms of the cycle of violence, see supra note 109 and ac-
companying text. 
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shape, so too did the profeminist model of treatment.246 And as the 
“power and control” wheel of the Domestic Abuse Intervention Pro-
ject (DAIP) of Duluth, Minnesota became the most popular invention 
in defining domestic violence, the profeminist Duluth Model became 
the most widely imitated treatment model.247 
(c)   The Duluth Model 
 While the Duluth Project began with an anger-management 
treatment program, it openly rejected this approach in 1984 and 
adopted a profeminist agenda with a focus on violence as a mecha-
nism of power and control.248 Almost twenty years after such a dras-
tic change, the Duluth Model continues to identify itself with several 
key feminist goals. To have batterers understand that their use of 
violence is a means of control, “women’s reality and women’s experi-
ences” are a constant part of the curriculum.249 Male participants ex-
amine their use of violence in its “cultural and social contexts,” with 
the program striving to reveal how violence is socially learned by 
men in order to ensure their control over women.250 Leaving no room 
for the suggestion that men may also be the “victims of sexism,” the 
program’s inevitably all male audience is forced to take full account-
ability.251 No attempt to “psychologize” the problem is tolerated, for 
such efforts detract from the focus on violence as a tool of power and 
control and risk providing men with a means of denying responsibil-
ity.252 Indeed, the patriarchal agenda is so controlling that group fa-
cilitators are discouraged from exploring participants’ personal prob-
                                                                                                                    
 246. For recognition of the current prevalence of the profeminist model, see JACOBSON 
& GOTTMAN, supra note 116, at 231; Adams, supra note 243, at 190; Hamberger & Hast-
ings, supra note 235, at 200-01; Hanna, supra note 147, at 1528-31; Pence & Shepard, 
supra note 232, at 282-85; Saunders, supra note 242, at 22. 
 247. For recognition of the Duluth program as the profeminist model most widely imi-
tated, see JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 116, at 231; WEXLER, supra note 116, at 13; 
Hanna, supra note 147, at 1530; Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 294. 
 For discussion of the “power and control” wheel and its development within the Duluth 
project, see PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 2-3. See also supra notes 111-15 and ac-
companying text. 
 248. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 29. It is interesting to note that the project’s 
change in 1984 coincided with other key developments that year, namely the Attorney 
General’s Task Force on Domestic Violence Report, the Minneapolis arrest experiment and 
the decision in Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). For a 
discussion of these events, see supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 249. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 30. 
 250. Id. at 5, 29; Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 289-90 (“Participants are taught 
that it is not their anger that leads them to be violent, but rather their belief that they 
have a right to control and dominate women.”). 
 251. Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 295; see also PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 
101, at 29. While some female batterers have also been noted to attend, the program’s ap-
proach toward such participants is much less demanding. See infra note 260 and accompa-
nying text (discussing female batterers and the Duluth program). 
 252. WEXLER, supra note 116, at 14. 
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lems, such as substance abuse or the particulars of their relation-
ships.253 Confronted with the categorical characterization of every 
batterer’s violence as a weapon of male domination, the program’s ul-
timate aspiration is to “undo sexism,” eliminating not just the vio-
lence, but all the tactics men use to oppress women. Having 
unlearned such behavior, it is replaced with more egalitarian atti-
tudes and skills.254 So executed, a batterer’s treatment program mod-
eled on the Duluth curriculum perfectly follows the flow of domestic 
violence theory—from explaining male behavior through power and 
control, to the final goal of equality.255 
 The unyielding support for treatment, in contrast to the equally 
strong support for aggressive arrest and prosecution policies, evi-
dences a basic feminist tension between the desire to publicly con-
demn and criminalize domestic violence and the desire to protect a 
woman’s autonomy by suggesting her life with the abuser may be re-
stored to the status quo—minus the violence and subordination.256 By 
one interpretation, the stereotypical female “ethic of care,” the female 
inherent nature to act in a relational, caring manner as opposed to a 
more male, isolationist manner is on display through this feminist 
call for rehabilitation.257 Yet at a deeper level, the support of treat-
ment, and more specifically feminist treatment, unequivocally re-
flects a more political goal. Mandating men to treatment gives femi-
nists their most desired audience—men. Once captive to the feminist 
program, men can be indoctrinated. First convinced that all their vio-
lent and nonviolent actions toward women are motivated by a desire 
to subjugate women, the men may then be educated in the manner 
which women feel they should be treated. 
 Certainly, ending gender motivated violence and ensuring women 
fair treatment are laudable objectives. Yet, ultimately, the control of 
                                                                                                                    
 253. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 29. 
 254. Id. at 7. For an extensive discussion of the Duluth Model’s curricular breakdown 
between explaining the patriarchal behavior of violent men and replacing such behavior 
with “noncontrolling and nonviolent ways of relating to women,” see id. at 30, 29-65. 
 255. Id. at 7. 
 256. See Hanna, supra note 147, at 1548-50. Professor Hanna similarly suggests that 
tension between feminist goals explains the ambivalence feminists manifest in supporting 
aggressive prosecution while simultaneously resisting “no-drop” policies which prohibit 
battered women from choosing to have the charges against their batterers dismissed. 
Hanna, supra note 106, at 1853, 1865-66; see also supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing prosecu-
tion goals and conflicts). 
 257. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1550. The female “ethic of care” originates with psy-
chologist Carol Gilligan. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (2d. ed. 1993). Since 
its coinage, the term and its association with women has been subjected to a great deal of 
criticism. For a sampling of positive reliance on Gilligan’s work by cultural feminists, see, 
for example, McClain, supra note 124, at 1182-83; Sherry, supra note 124, at 580, 585, 587; 
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 126, at 
493, 500-01. For negative treatment of Gilligan in radical feminist thought, see, for exam-
ple, MACKINNON, supra note 100, at 38-39. 
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gender is not eradicated through the profeminist agenda; rather, it 
shifts. For as Cheryl Hanna sharply explains, “[t]reatment programs 
turn the tables of control from misogynist men to profeminist women 
and men whose agenda it is to restructure gender relations.”258 
 Beyond the gender empowerment issues, the Duluth Model’s ex-
clusively feminist focus fails to even allow for the possibility that a 
man’s violence might be caused by other conditions. Recent research 
suggests that abusive men can be described through a variety of pro-
files and that more positive, less confrontational models of treatment 
may be more effective.259 The Duluth Model’s unyielding reliance on 
treatment also ignores other legitimate goals of punishment and the 
methods used to achieve them. Yet, the most gaping hole in today’s 
response to batterers is the failure to consider the reality of female 
batterers. Under feminist control, today’s treatment denies the pos-
sibility that women can be violent. Accordingly, it fails to provide any 
means of treating or otherwise responding to female intimate vio-
lence. Even the few female offenders who do manage to end up in 
treatment, despite the layers of social and legal bias, are ultimately 
not required to assume the accountability demanded of male batter-
ers. Authors of The Duluth Model maintain that such women must 
have used violence in self-defense.260 
 As with arrest and prosecution policies, the sincere commitment 
to ending domestic violence is not evident in today’s judicial system. 
The goal has been lost in the pursuit of the feminist agenda. Like-
wise, services to victims of domestic violence have also fallen under 
feminist control. 
4.   Victim Services 
(a)   Shelters 
 By far, shelters are the predominant service for victims of domes-
                                                                                                                    
 258. Hanna, supra note 147, at 1550. As the Director of the Relationship Violence 
Training Institute in San Diego similarly notes: 
When it comes to the values of respectful relationships, not only do treatment 
providers need to preach them, but they also have to show them. There is a 
danger of establishing a power hierarchy in the treatment setting that subtly 
reinforces power tactics—and that alienates the very population we want to 
reach. 
WEXLER, supra note 116, at 15. 
 259. See infra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical efforts to dees-
sentialize the batterer); infra Part V.B. (discussing practical efforts to develop more client-
centered batterer treatment programs). 
 260. At the time The Duluth Model was published, the Duluth program had worked 
with one-hundred women. This number comprised 3.5% of the offenders required to attend 
the program. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 6. For the Duluth authors, male offend-
ers also need to be treated in a much more serious manner than female offenders because 
male victims of female violence are much more capable of leaving violent relationships 
without the fear of retaliation felt by female victims. Id.  
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tic violence.261 While the shelter movement began in England as early 
as 1971, the United States soon followed suit.262 By 1974, the first 
shelter for women was opened in St. Paul, Minnesota.263 By 1986, 
over 700 domestic violence shelters were counted in the United 
States.264 Since then, the number has virtually doubled.265 
 As shelters have grown, so have their role. Originally recognized 
as a “crisis service,” shelters now provide a range of services.266 In 
addition to refuge, other immediate assistance is provided to both 
residents and nonresidents through the availability of emergency 
hotlines, food, child care, transportation, support groups, and refer-
rals to additional services.267 Through direct counseling services, as 
well as access to the network of legal and community service provid-
ers, shelters are considered critical to victims of domestic violence 
who seek permanent lifestyle changes by: finding alternative living 
arrangements, pursuing child custody and divorce, filing criminal 
charges, receiving job training or employment leads, and working to 
separate from their abusers.268 
 Despite the growth in and reliance on shelters, there is little em-
pirical evidence of their effectiveness.269 While shelter studies have 
used such measures as the recurrence of violence, the long-term 
separation of victim and abuser, and rates of victim satisfaction, the 
results are all equivocal.270 Legitimate concerns are raised as to 
whether any of such yardsticks accurately reflect the success of shel-
ters. Victim evaluation studies are overly subjective and have tended 
to review attitudes toward various types of counseling, not shelter 
services per se.271 Because the threat of separation assault attaches 
to any effort to leave a violent relationship, separation is routinely 
                                                                                                                    
 261. Shelters have recently been reported to account for 1200 of the 1800 programs in 
the United States for victims of domestic violence who are either spouses or intimate part-
ners. VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, supra note 224, at 110. 
 262. See Richard A. Berk et al., What a Difference a Day Makes: An Empirical Study of 
the Impact of Shelters for Battered Women, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 481, 482 (1986); Mary 
Ann Dutton-Douglas & Dorothy Dionne, Counseling and Shelter Services for Battered 
Women, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES, supra note 116, at 113. 
 263. Known as “Women’s House,” the shelter was opened by the Women’s Advocates. 
WALLACE, supra note 219, at 177; Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 282-83. 
 264. Berk et al., supra note 262, at 482. 
 265. VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, supra note 224, at 110 (noting the existence of 1200 do-
mestic violence shelters in the United States by the late 1990s). 
 266. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 130, at 77. 
 267. For an overview of the intervention services offered by shelters, see GONDOLF & 
FISHER, supra note 130, at 78; Dutton-Douglas & Dionne, supra note 262, at 114-21.  
 268. Dutton-Douglas & Dionne, supra note 262. 
 269.  GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 130, at 81; Berk et al., supra note 262, at 481; 
Dutton-Douglas & Dionne, supra note 262, at 113. 
 270. Dutton-Douglas & Dionne, supra note 262, at 121. 
 271. Self-reported evaluations have generally investigated victims’ attitudes toward 
services provided by women’s groups as opposed to religious or more general social organi-
zations. Id. at 124. 
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recognized to be an inadequate measure of shelter success as shelter 
stays may lead to more, rather than less violence.272 Violence recur-
rence studies may be the best means of evaluating shelter success. 
However, they too are flawed. Surveying only domestic violence vic-
tims who have sought shelter services, such studies lack a control 
group and instead rely on nonrandom samples that may not accu-
rately reflect the diverse pool of domestic violence victims.273 Yet, af-
ter accounting for such methodological concerns and recognizing the 
risk of increased violence upon separation, violence recurrence stud-
ies generally associate a victim’s use of shelter services with a reduc-
tion in violence.274 But instead of finding a causal link between shel-
ters and violence reduction, such studies conclude that it is not the 
victim’s decision to utilize shelter services but rather the victim’s as-
sertion of control which stops violence. When a victim’s use of shelter 
services is not perceived by the batterer as part of a “serious” deci-
sion to leave the relationship, the action is simply another display of 
disobedience that must be met with more violence for punitive ef-
fect.275 
 Such findings and criticisms of shelters certainly do not explain 
the support shelters enjoy. Yet, rather than detracting from the en-
dorsement of shelters, such empirical findings have been relied upon 
to advocate for shelters as an integral part of a coordinated effort to 
supply a wider range of victim services.276 Why are shelters so 
strongly supported?  
                                                                                                                    
 272. Id. at 121-23 (finding separation studies to be “[a]t best . . . only an indirect meas-
ure of intervention effectiveness”); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 130, at 80, 82. For a 
thorough discussion of separation assault, see Mahoney, supra note 108. See also supra 
note 138 and accompanying text. 
 273. Berk et al., supra note 262, at 484. 
 274. For a collection of violence recurrence studies, see id. (studying the recurrence of 
violence for victims seeking shelter services in Santa Barbara, CA); Dutton-Douglas & 
Dione, supra note 262, at 124 (reviewing various studies); Maryse Rinfret-Raynor & 
Solange Cantin, Feminist Therapy for Battered Women: An Assessment, in OUT OF THE 
DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 90, at 219 
(studying violence recurrence and other factors for battered women participating in vari-
ous therapies). 
 275. Berk et al., supra note 262, at 484; see also GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 130, at 
82; Dutton-Douglas & Dionne, supra note 262, at 124. 
 276. One study stated: 
The overall implication in these findings is that shelters cannot do it alone. 
More than shelter refuge is needed to help women maintain some semblance of 
safety. Battered women need a wide variety of services and resources to leave 
their batterers. There also needs to be vigilant coordination with batterer pro-
grams to assure that the batterer’s counseling does not mistakenly lure women 
back to an unsafe relationship. In sum, the community help sources need to be 
more systematically coordinated in order to effectively assist wife abuse.   
GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 130, at 88. 
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(b)   The Feminist Politics of Shelters 
 As with other aspects of the domestic violence system, because 
shelters began in the “formative years” of the battered women’s 
movement, they too are built upon the feminist framework.277 Over-
riding the shelter objective of helping victims of domestic violence to 
safety is the belief that women live in a world of “male imposed isola-
tion” and that a shelter offers a means of escape from this world.278 
This feminist politicization of shelters is both openly acknowledged 
and celebrated.279 Shelters provide women’s groups with: 
a place where batterers and their coconspirators in the system 
cannot control the discussion; they cannot interpret the facts; they 
cannot silence women’s minds nor keep women from speaking . . . . 
[T]he groups are designed to create a safe space for women to find 
their personal power to join with other women to take back control 
of their lives.280  
Or more simply, “[t]he role of the shelter and the advocate cannot be 
underestimated.”281 
 Given such strong feminist influence, it is no surprise that the 
wide variety of residential and nonresidential services offered by 
shelters is extended almost exclusively to female victims of domestic 
violence. Only a handful of men’s shelters have ever existed.282 The 
belief that men could not possibly need the services of domestic vio-
lence shelters is so widespread that it has been implicitly assumed in 
the judicial review of gender-based challenges made by battered 
women denied the opportunity to build a shelter.283 
 While it is acknowledged that the few shelters that have opened 
for battered men have been closed for lack of support and patronage, 
this history does not lend itself to arguments against services for 
                                                                                                                    
 277. See Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 282-83. 
 278. Id. at 291. 
 279. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 101, at 11; see also Pence & Shepard, supra note 
232, at 282. Yet for current support for the depoliticization of clinics and greater attention 
to gender-neutral services and family violence generally, see infra notes 296-301 and ac-
companying text. 
 280. Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 290-91. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See COOK, supra note 44, at 54, 156, 168 (noting that only one or two shelters for 
battered men have existed). 
 283. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 328 (3d Cir. 1989). In this case, the 
shelter application had been denied as a result of a local zoning ordinance which prevented 
transitional dwelling in residential areas which would house more than six people (includ-
ing children). In rejecting the women’s disparate impact claim made pursuant to the Fair 
Housing Act, the court found the battered women’s denial of shelter space to be no greater 
than the denial which would come to a similarly situated group of men who might need a 
shelter for other purposes, such as alcoholism. In so doing, the court implicitly assumed 
both that only women could be abused and that only men could be alcoholics. Id. at 328.  
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male victims of domestic violence.284 The lack of support is not a re-
sult of the lack of need of services for battered men. Rather, it can 
more fairly be attributed to the widespread denial of female violence 
and the stigmatization felt by any man claiming to be a victim of 
such.285 It may be argued that shelters for homeless men are ample 
enough to absorb any population of battered men.286 However, in 
some areas, particularly large metropolitan areas, there is not suffi-
cient shelter space to assist all men seeking shelter.287 In the case of 
battered men accompanied by their children, the lack of adequate 
physical space becomes more critical. There is terrific difficulty in 
finding suitable shelter for homeless families, particularly those 
headed by men.288 
 Even if it is conceded that battered women may have a greater 
need for shelter space than battered men, such concession does not 
mandate that both the services and the space provided by a battered 
women’s shelter cannot be utilized to accommodate battered men. 
Existing space is often already partitioned in such a way to give 
families separate living quarters. Future space can be built to better 
accommodate battered men.289 Yet, perhaps most importantly, as is 
recognized in the support of domestic violence shelters, shelters pro-
vide more than a place of physical safety. Domestic violence shelters 
offer “hope, support, and counseling specifically targeted to the vic-
tims of domestic violence.”290 Such an offer should be as readily made 
to battered men as it is to battered women. 
V.   THE CHALLENGE 
 From the theoretical definition of domestic violence, to the practi-
cal treatment of arrest, prosecution, punishment and victim services, 
feminism controls domestic violence. Such an approach is a loss for 
both sexes. Battered men are prevented from seeking relief. Violent 
women are not restrained. To the extent legitimate, non-patriarchal 
explanations of domestic violence are suppressed, battered women 
also remain at risk. But as feminists have strongly held in their work 
on domestic violence, “[i]t is the constant interaction of theory and 
practice that keeps a movement dynamic, growing, changing, and 
most importantly, moving.”291 To remain truly committed to keeping 
                                                                                                                    
 284. See COOK, supra note 44, at 156. 
 285. See id. at 155. For further discussion of societal attitudes toward female violence, 
see supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 286. See COOK, supra note 44, at 155. 
 287. See id. at 155-57. 
 288. See id. at 156. 
 289. See id. at 156-57. 
 290. Id. at 156. 
 291. Pence & Shepard, supra note 232, at 297. 
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the domestic violence movement moving, domestic violence theory 
must now be challenged. Revitalizing the domestic violence move-
ment calls upon the strength of both theoreticians and practitioners 
and upon both women and men. It also requires suggestions for 
change. Such efforts can be initiated by first recognizing the value of 
many current discussions and projects and then building upon them. 
A.   A Challenge to Theory 
 Just as we have successfully challenged the “essential” battered 
woman, the image of the “essential” battering male is ripe for chal-
lenge.292 Contrary to feminist assumptions, not all male batterers are 
motivated by gender domination. Recent profile studies of male bat-
terers dispel the “homogeneous” batterer myth.293 In its place are 
findings which suggest that batterers can be divided into subtypes 
based upon considerations of the extent of their marital violence, 
general violence (which is directed toward both strangers and inti-
mates) and any psychopathological or personality disorders.294 From 
such typologies, research may still support the theory that a bat-
terer’s violence may be motivated by patriarchal interests. However, 
this characterization cannot be made in all cases. To the extent vio-
lent behavior is indiscriminate, or a product of either a physical or 
mental disorder, no patriarchal charge can be made.295 Pursuing such 
sophisticated, complex theories which explore the variety of reasons 
a man might commit domestic violence, will yield more effective tools 
for addressing and preventing domestic violence.296 
                                                                                                                    
 292. See Hanna, supra note 147, at 1561-62. The prototypical battered woman suffered 
from learned helplessness and failed to account for the diversity of needs and interests 
brought on by differences in such factors as race, religion, class, age, culture, or immigra-
tion status. There have been various contributions deessentializing the battered woman. 
See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 108 (exploring the various intersectional contexts of bat-
tered women); Hart, supra note 96, at 99 (warning against perpetuating a homogeneous 
battered woman); Kelly, supra note 108, at 311-14 (reviewing the cultural and immigration 
complications faced by battered women); Meier, supra note 106, at 1305-07 (discussing the 
fallacies of learned helplessness theory); Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural 
Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural De-
fense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991) (examining cultural attitudes toward domestic violence 
held by individuals from Asian and Pacific Rim countries in the United States); Seymore, 
supra note 116, at 1065 n.214 (noting the diversity amongst battered women). 
 293. FAGAN, supra note 154, at 36. 
 294. Id. (citing Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & Gregory L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Bat-
terers: Three Subtypes and Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994); see 
also Hanna, supra note 147, at 1563-72 (reviewing the research on the reasons why men 
batter). 
 295. See FAGAN, supra  note 154, at 36. 
 296. See Hanna, supra note 147, at 1561; Daniel G. Saunders, Husbands Who Assault: 
Multiple Profiles Requiring Multiple Responses, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT, 
supra note 116, at 9-30. For a discussion of practical proposals regarding domestic violence 
prosecution and treatment built on developing theory, see infra Part V.B. 
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 Yet, beyond more effectively addressing the violence of men, such 
work must be recognized for its contribution to recognizing the vio-
lence of women. Once the patriarchal element is removed and re-
placed by gender neutral explanations for violence, it logically follows 
that violence may be committed by women as well as men. This theo-
retical move is consistent with other theoretical efforts that have al-
ready implicitly accepted that domestic violence is not only commit-
ted by men and that it is not always motivated by gender. Domestic 
violence takes form in elder abuse,297 child abuse,298 and sibling 
abuse.299 Homosexual abuse, including lesbian battering, is also fi-
nally being acknowledged.300 In combination with the magnitude of 
                                                                                                                    
 297. For a selection from the work on elder abuse, see, for example, LYNDA AITKEN & 
GABRIELE GRIFFIN, GENDER ISSUES IN ELDER ABUSE (1996); GERRY BENNETT & PAUL 
KINGSTON, ELDER ABUSE: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND INTERVENTIONS (1993); MICHAEL 
BROGDEN & PREETI NIJHAR, CRIME, ABUSE AND THE ELDERLY (2000); PATRICIA J. 
BRONELL, FAMILY CRIMES AGAINST THE ELDERLY: ELDER ABUSE AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998); FRANCES MERCHANT CARP, ELDER ABUSE IN THE FAMILY: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR RESEARCH (2000); YVONNE JOAN CRAIG, ELDER ABUSE AND 
MEDIATION: EXPLORATORY STUDIES IN AMERICA, BRITAIN AND EUROPE (1997); RICHARD J. 
GELLES & CLAIRE PEDRICK CORNELL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 100-04 (2d ed. 
1990); INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, supra note 14, at 113-19; THE MISTREATMENT OF 
ELDERLY PEOPLE (Peter Decalmer & Frank Glendenning eds., 1997); UNDERSTANDING 
ELDER ABUSE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS (Toshio Tatara ed., 1999); WALLACE, supra note 
219, at 237-57. 
 298. For a sampling from the vast literature on child abuse, see, for example, CONNIE 
BURROWS HORTON & TRACY K. CRUISE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE SCHOOL’S 
RESPONSE (2001); CHILD ABUSE: A GLOBAL VIEW (Beth M. Schwartz-Kenney et al. eds., 
2001); CHILD ABUSE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Byrgen Finkelman ed., 1995); CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS (Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 
1987); CHILD ABUSE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACROSS THE 
LIFESPAN (David A. Wolfe et al. eds., 1997); CHILD MALTREATMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 
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studies reporting on female intimate violence, such research power-
fully challenges existing feminist assumptions.301 Women are capable 
of intimate violence. Men can be victims. 
B.   A Challenge to Practice 
 It is indisputable that feminists have engaged in hard and sincere 
work on the domestic violence front. The feminist “discovery” of do-
mestic violence and subsequent efforts have made it an issue of terri-
fic public importance.302 The value of these feminist efforts should 
never be minimized. However, while not detracting from such pro-
gress, it must also be recognized that the limits of feminist theory 
prevent a full understanding of domestic violence. In addition to its 
advances, feminist theory is responsible for the limits of existing do-
mestic violence theory and policies. By expanding the theoretical 
foundation to allow for the possibility of domestic violence in every 
intimate human relationship, new perspectives on how to effectively 
address domestic violence will inevitably develop. In new explora-
tions of such issues as punishment and victim services, such work 
has already begun. 
 In the punishment context, the appreciation of the multi-
dimensional profiles of batterers has led to the recommendation of an 
array of treatment programs and other responses, which go well be-
yond the Duluth Model.303 While a great deal of such work remains 
limited to the context of male batterers, it rejects the premise that all 
violence is a function of patriarchy.304 Rather than helping to build 
“respectful relationships,” such feminist “shame-based” programs in-
stead “[establish] a power hierarchy in the treatment setting that 
subtly reinforces power tactics—and that alienates the very popula-
tion we want to reach.”305 Advocates of more “client-centered” solu-
tions reject “confrontational approaches” which focus exclusively on 
gender and power issues.306 Their proposals include counseling and 
substance abuse programs geared to address different mental and 
physical conditions.307 Characterizing some batterers as “[b]orderline 
and sociopathic abusers” who are untreatable, the use of incarcera-
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tion is also recommended.308 Similarly, advocates in the shelter 
movement are also adopting new perspectives. Rather than prioritiz-
ing the feminist agenda, greater attention is being paid to the deliv-
ery of more practical services such as those relating to housing and 
crisis intervention.309 
CONCLUSION 
 Such work marks the beginning of a positive, new direction for the 
domestic violence movement. Of course, much more needs to be done. 
For academicians and scholars, greater exploration of the physical, 
mental, and social conditions that give rise to domestic violence must 
be undertaken. Such work will lay the groundwork for activists who 
can develop more effective policies and programs for police, court of-
ficials, social workers, and others engaged in the fight against do-
mestic violence. Legitimate concerns about how best to use limited 
funding can also be raised without having to rely upon more under-
handed tactics meant to suppress any recognition of female violence. 
Through such a hard but sincere struggle, feminists and their work 
will not be ignored. Instead, patriarchy and gender will be recognized 
as one of many reasons why domestic violence exists. In so doing, 
feminism will maintain its legitimacy. And, with a great deal of hope, 
effort, and time, a real end to domestic violence will be found. 
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